Rational expectations equilibria are analyzed as incentive compatible mechanisms. The sense in which they can be implemented is made precise. Then, a welfare analysis of these equilibria is carried out within the class of mechanisms having the same incentive compatibility properties and the same communication constraints.
MLA
Laffont, Jean-Jacques. “On the Welfare Analysis of Rational Expectations Equilibria with Asymmetric Information.” Econometrica, vol. 53, .no 1, Econometric Society, 1985, pp. 1-30, https://www.jstor.org/stable/1911721
Chicago
Laffont, Jean-Jacques. “On the Welfare Analysis of Rational Expectations Equilibria with Asymmetric Information.” Econometrica, 53, .no 1, (Econometric Society: 1985), 1-30. https://www.jstor.org/stable/1911721
APA
Laffont, J.-J. (1985). On the Welfare Analysis of Rational Expectations Equilibria with Asymmetric Information. Econometrica, 53(1), 1-30. https://www.jstor.org/stable/1911721
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