

# Supplement to “Estimation and inference in games of incomplete information with unobserved heterogeneity and large state space”

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## APPENDIX B: PROOFS

In this Supplemental Appendix, we provide proofs for the results in Fan, Jiang, and Shi (2024).

### B.1 Proofs of results in Section 2

**PROOF OF LEMMA 2.1.** Under Assumptions 2.1–2.5, CCPs are identified up to a label swapping, which enables us to identify expected payoffs (via  $F^{-1}(\cdot)$ ) and set up the system:  $G(\pi) \equiv \bar{\pi} - \Gamma\pi$ . Under Assumption 2.6, the systems corresponding to  $c \neq c_0$  has no solution. Note that system corresponding to  $c_0$  always has a solution, as  $\pi_0$  generates the system corresponding to  $c_0$ . Under the condition that  $\Gamma_{c_0}$  has full column rank, this  $\pi_0$  is uniquely determined by  $\bar{\pi}_{c_0}$  and  $\Gamma_{c_0}$ .  $\square$

### B.2 Proofs of results in Section 3

Lemma B.1 is used to prove Theorem 3.1. Lemmas B.2 and B.3 are introduced to prove Theorem 3.2.

**LEMMA B.1.** *Let the result of Lemma 2.1 and the following assumptions hold for the Simple Game. (i) For any  $\pi \in \Pi$ ,  $G_n(\pi) = G(\pi) + O_p(n^{-1/2})$ . (ii) For any  $c \in \mathcal{C}_n$ ,  $W_n(c) = W(c) + o_p(1)$  with  $W(c)$  being positive definite. (iii) For any  $c \in \mathcal{C}_n$ ,  $\min_{\pi \in \Pi} \|G_{n,c}(\pi)\|_{W_n(c)}^2 \xrightarrow{P} \min_{\pi \in \Pi} \|G_c(\pi)\|_{W(c)}^2$ . Then it holds that  $\hat{c} = c_0$  wp  $\rightarrow 1$  and  $\hat{\pi} \xrightarrow{P} \pi_0$  for any  $l_1 \in \{l_\pi, l_\pi + 1, \dots, l\}$ ,  $\alpha_1 \in (0, 1]$ ,  $\lambda \in (-1, 0)$ , and  $\Delta \in \{1, \dots, l - l_1\}$ .*

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PROOF OF LEMMA B.1. For  $s = 1, \dots, S$ , let  $sc_0^s \in \mathcal{S}\mathcal{C}^s$  denote the subselection vector whose first  $2l_s$  elements are the same as those of  $c_0$ . We first show that  $\Pr(sc_0^s \in \mathcal{S}\mathcal{C}_n^s) \rightarrow 1$  for  $s = 1, \dots, S$ . This implies that  $\Pr(c_0 \in \mathcal{C}_n) \rightarrow 1$ , because  $c_0 \in \mathcal{C}_n$  occurs if and only if  $sc_0^s \in \mathcal{S}\mathcal{C}_n^s$  occurs.

We first prove the result for  $s = 1$ . By Lemma 2.1, we have that  $G_{c_0}(\pi_0) = \mathbf{0}$ . Together with Assumption (i) in the lemma, we can obtain that  $\|G_{n,c_0}(\pi_0)\|^2 = O_p(n^{-1})$  and  $\|G_{n,sc_0^1}(\pi_0)\|^2 = O_p(n^{-1})$ . Therefore, it holds that  $J_n(sc_0^1) \leq \|G_{n,sc_0^1}(\pi_0)\|^2 = O_p(n^{-1})$ . For any  $sc^1 \in \mathcal{S}\mathcal{C}^1$ , if  $J_n(sc^1) \leq n^\lambda$ , then  $sc^1 \in \mathcal{S}\mathcal{C}_n^1$  occurs. And for any  $\alpha_1 > 0$ ,  $\mathcal{S}\mathcal{C}_n^1$  can contain  $sc^1$ 's such that  $J_n(sc^1) > n^\lambda$ . Thus, we obtain that for any  $\lambda > -1$ ,

$$1 \geq \Pr(sc_0^1 \in \mathcal{S}\mathcal{C}_n^1) \geq \Pr(J_n(sc_0^1) \leq n^\lambda) \rightarrow 1.$$

Hence, we obtain that  $\Pr(sc_0^1 \in \mathcal{S}\mathcal{C}_n^1) \rightarrow 1$ .

$\Pr(sc_0^2 \in \mathcal{S}\mathcal{C}_n^2 | sc_0^1 \in \mathcal{S}\mathcal{C}_n^1) \rightarrow 1$  and  $\Pr(sc_0^2 \in \mathcal{S}\mathcal{C}^2) \rightarrow 1$  together imply that  $\Pr(sc_0^2 \in \mathcal{S}\mathcal{C}_n^2) \rightarrow 1$ . The convergence of  $\Pr(sc_0^2 \in \mathcal{S}\mathcal{C}_n^2 | sc_0^1 \in \mathcal{S}\mathcal{C}_n^1) \rightarrow 1$  follows from the same argument as  $\Pr(sc_0^1 \in \mathcal{S}\mathcal{C}_n^1) \rightarrow 1$ ; and  $sc_0^1 \in \mathcal{S}\mathcal{C}_n^1$  implies that  $sc_0^2 \in \mathcal{S}\mathcal{C}^2$ . Thus, we have that  $\Pr(sc_0^2 \in \mathcal{S}\mathcal{C}_n^2) \rightarrow 1$ . Applying the same argument sequentially, we can obtain that  $\Pr(sc_0^s \in \mathcal{S}\mathcal{C}_n^s) \rightarrow 1$  for  $s = 1, \dots, S$ . By the definition of  $\mathcal{C}_n$ , elements in  $\mathcal{C}_n$  select all possible combinations of the last  $2(l - l_S)$  moments allowed by  $\mathcal{C}$ . The event  $sc_0^S \in \mathcal{S}\mathcal{C}_n^S$  occurs if and only if  $c_0 \in \mathcal{C}_n$  occurs. Thus, we have that  $\Pr(c_0 \in \mathcal{C}_n) \rightarrow 1$ .

Next, we show that if  $c_0 \in \mathcal{C}_n$ , then  $\Pr(\widehat{c} = c_0) \rightarrow 1$ . For any  $c \in \mathcal{C}_n$  and  $c \neq c_0$ , Assumption (iii) implies that

$$\min_{\pi \in \Pi} \|G_{n,c}(\pi)\|_{W_n(c)}^2 \xrightarrow{p} \min_{\pi \in \Pi} \|G_c(\pi)\|_{W(c)}^2 > 0, \quad (\text{B.1})$$

where the inequality follows from Lemma 2.1 and Assumption (ii). Again by Lemma 2.1, we have that  $G_{c_0}(\pi_0) = \mathbf{0}$ . Then by Assumption (i), it holds that  $G_{n,c_0}(\pi_0) = o_p(1)$ . Therefore, we obtain that

$$\min_{\pi \in \Pi} \|G_{n,c_0}(\pi)\|_{W_n(c_0)}^2 \leq \|G_{n,c_0}(\pi_0)\|_{W_n(c_0)}^2 = o_p(1). \quad (\text{B.2})$$

(B.1) and (B.2) together imply that  $\Pr(\widehat{c} = c_0 | c_0 \in \mathcal{C}_n) \rightarrow 1$ . Combining with  $\Pr(c_0 \in \mathcal{C}_n) \rightarrow 1$ , we conclude that  $\Pr(\widehat{c} = c_0) \rightarrow 1$ .

It remains to show that  $\widehat{\pi} \xrightarrow{p} \pi_0$ . Define  $\check{\pi} \equiv \arg \min_{\pi \in \Pi} \|G_{n,c_0}(\pi)\|_{W_n(c_0)}^2$ . We have that  $\check{\pi}$  converges in probability to its population counterpart  $\pi_0$  by the standard argument for consistency of a GMM estimator provided that Lemma 2.1 holds. Thus, for any  $\epsilon > 0$  and  $\delta > 0$ , we can find  $N_1$  such that  $\Pr(\|\check{\pi} - \pi_0\| > \frac{\epsilon}{2}) < \frac{\delta}{2}$  for  $n \geq N_1$ . Because  $\widehat{c} = c_0$  implies  $\widehat{\pi} = \check{\pi}$ , we have  $\Pr(\widehat{\pi} = \check{\pi}) \geq \Pr(\widehat{c} = c_0) \rightarrow 1$ . Thus, for the given  $\epsilon > 0$  and  $\delta > 0$ , we can find  $N_2$  such that  $\Pr(\|\widehat{\pi} - \check{\pi}\| > \frac{\epsilon}{2}) < \frac{\delta}{2}$  for  $n \geq N_2$ . Combing the above two results, we have that for any given  $\epsilon > 0$  and  $\delta > 0$ , there exists  $N \equiv \max\{N_1, N_2\}$  such that for  $n > N$ ,

$$\begin{aligned} \Pr(\|\widehat{\pi} - \pi_0\| > \epsilon) &= \Pr(\|\widehat{\pi} - \check{\pi} + \check{\pi} - \pi_0\| > \epsilon) \\ &\leq \Pr\left(\|\widehat{\pi} - \check{\pi}\| > \frac{\epsilon}{2}\right) + \Pr\left(\|\check{\pi} - \pi_0\| > \frac{\epsilon}{2}\right) \leq \delta. \end{aligned}$$

Therefore, the result  $\widehat{\pi} \xrightarrow{p} \pi_0$  holds.  $\square$

PROOF OF THEOREM 3.1. We prove the theorem by verifying the conditions in Lemma B.1. Lemma 2.1 holds by Assumptions 2.1–2.6. Assumption (ii) in Lemma B.1 is implied by Assumption 3.2. It remains to show that Assumptions (i) and (iii) in Lemma B.1 are satisfied.

Let  $\mathbf{p}$  be the vector that stores the CCPs of all players on all observed and latent states ( $\mathbf{z} \in \{\mathbf{z}^1, \dots, \mathbf{z}^J\}$  and  $k \in \{A, B\}$ ) and  $\hat{\mathbf{p}}$  be its consistent estimator obtained via the eigen-decomposition method. Because the estimated coefficient matrix in the Simple Game is a smooth function of  $\hat{\mathbf{p}}$ , we write it in the form of  $\Gamma_n \equiv \mathbf{e}(\hat{\mathbf{p}})$  for some smooth function  $\mathbf{e}(\cdot)$ . Similarly, the estimated expected payoff vector can be written in the form of  $\bar{\pi}_n \equiv \mathbf{F}^{-1}(\hat{\mathbf{p}})$ , where  $\mathbf{F}^{-1}(\hat{\mathbf{p}})$  stacks  $F^{-1}(p_{1zk})$  for any  $\mathbf{z} \in \{\mathbf{z}^1, \dots, \mathbf{z}^J\}$  and  $k \in \{A, B\}$ . Thus, the sample moment functions can be written as  $G_n(\pi) = \mathbf{F}^{-1}(\hat{\mathbf{p}}) - \mathbf{e}(\hat{\mathbf{p}})\pi$ . By differentiability of  $\mathbf{F}^{-1}(\cdot)$  and  $\mathbf{e}(\cdot)$ , given any  $\pi$ , the mean value expansion of  $G_n(\pi)$  with respect to  $\mathbf{p}$  gives

$$\sqrt{n}(G_n(\pi) - G(\pi)) = \sqrt{n}D_{\mathbf{p}^*}(\pi)(\hat{\mathbf{p}} - \mathbf{p}),$$

where  $D_{\mathbf{p}^*}(\pi) = \frac{\partial \mathbf{F}^{-1}(\mathbf{p}^*)}{\partial \mathbf{p}^*} - \frac{\partial (\mathbf{e}(\mathbf{p}^*)\pi)}{\partial \mathbf{p}^*}$  and  $\mathbf{p}^*$  is a point between  $\hat{\mathbf{p}}$  and  $\mathbf{p}$ . Under Assumptions 2.1–2.6, Lemma C.2 in Xiao (2018) implies that  $\hat{\mathbf{p}}$  is consistent and  $\sqrt{n}(\hat{\mathbf{p}} - \mathbf{p})$  converges to a normal distribution. Under Assumption 2.1(i) and (ii), we have that  $D_{\mathbf{p}^*}(\pi) \xrightarrow{p} D_{\mathbf{p}}(\pi) \equiv \frac{\partial \mathbf{F}^{-1}(\mathbf{p})}{\partial \mathbf{p}} - \frac{\partial (\mathbf{e}(\mathbf{p})\pi)}{\partial \mathbf{p}}$ , where  $D_{\mathbf{p}}$  is bounded for any  $\pi \in \Pi$ . Therefore, it holds that  $\sqrt{n}(G_n(\pi) - G(\pi)) = O_p(1)$ , which verifies Assumption (i) in Lemma B.1.

For Assumption (iii) in Lemma B.1, it suffices to prove that for any  $c \in \mathcal{C}_n$

$$\max_{\pi \in \Pi} |G_{n,c}(\pi)^\top W_n(c)G_{n,c}(\pi) - G_c(\pi)^\top W(c)G_c(\pi)| = o_p(1),$$

where  $\max$  is used rather than  $\sup$  because  $\Pi$  is compact by Assumption 3.1 and both  $G_{n,c}(\cdot)$  and  $G_c(\cdot)$  are continuous in  $\pi$ . The triangular inequality provides that

$$\begin{aligned} & \max_{\pi \in \Pi} |G_{n,c}(\pi)^\top W_n(c)G_{n,c}(\pi) - G_c(\pi)^\top W(c)G_c(\pi)| \\ & \leq \max_{\pi \in \Pi} |G_{n,c}(\pi)^\top W_n(c)G_{n,c}(\pi) - G_{nc}(\pi)^\top W(c)G_{nc}(\pi)| \\ & \quad + \max_{\pi \in \Pi} |G_{n,c}(\pi)^\top W(c)G_{n,c}(\pi) - G_c(\pi)^\top W(c)G_c(\pi)|. \end{aligned}$$

By the property of the matrix infinity norm,<sup>1</sup> the first term on the right-hand side of the inequality is bounded above by  $\max_{\pi \in \Pi} \|c\|_0 \|G_{n,c}(\pi)\|^2 \|W_n(c) - W(c)\|_\infty$ .  $\Pi$  is bounded. Moreover,  $\Gamma_n$  and  $\bar{\pi}_n$  are both  $O_p(1)$  by the continuity of  $\mathbf{e}(\cdot)$  and  $\mathbf{F}^{-1}(\cdot)$  and the consistency of  $\hat{\mathbf{p}}$ . Therefore, we have  $\max_{\pi \in \Pi} \|G_{n,c}(\pi)\|^2 = O_p(1)$ . By Assumption 3.2, it holds that  $\|W_n(c) - W(c)\|_\infty = o_p(1)$ . Thus, the first term is  $o_p(1)$ . For the second term, it holds that

$$\max_{\pi \in \Pi} |G_{n,c}(\pi)^\top W(c)G_{n,c}(\pi) - G_c(\pi)^\top W(c)G_c(\pi)|$$

<sup>1</sup>For a generic matrix  $E$ ,  $\|E\|_\infty$  denotes the matrix infinity norm that equals the maximum absolute row sum of matrix  $E$ .

$$\begin{aligned}
&= \max_{\pi \in \Pi} |G_{n,c}(\pi)^\top W(c)(G_{n,c}(\pi) - G_c(\pi) + G_c(\pi)) - G_c(\pi)^\top W(c)G_c(\pi)| \\
&\leq \max_{\pi \in \Pi} |G_{n,c}(\pi)^\top W(c)(G_{n,c}(\pi) - G_c(\pi))| \\
&\quad + \max_{\pi \in \Pi} |G_{n,c}(\pi)^\top W(c)G_c(\pi) - G_c(\pi)^\top W(c)G_c(\pi)| \\
&\leq \max_{\pi \in \Pi} \|G_{n,c}(\pi)^\top W(c)\|_\infty \max_{\pi \in \Pi} \|G_{n,c}(\pi) - G_c(\pi)\| \\
&\quad + \max_{\pi \in \Pi} \|G_{n,c}(\pi) - G_c(\pi)\| \max_{\pi \in \Pi} \|W(c)G_c(\pi)\|_\infty \\
&= o_p(1),
\end{aligned}$$

where the first and second inequality follow from the triangular inequality and applying matrix norm, and last equality holds by  $\Gamma_n$  and  $\bar{\pi}_n$  being  $O_p(1)$  and the compactness of  $\Pi$ .

Hence, we have verified all the conditions in Lemma B.1. The claimed theorem holds.  $\square$

**LEMMA B.2.** *Let  $\alpha_s^* \equiv |\mathcal{S}\mathcal{C}_n^s|/|\mathcal{S}\mathcal{C}^s|$ . Given  $l_1, \alpha_1, \lambda$ , and  $\Delta$ , assume that there exists some  $s^\dagger \in \{2, \dots, S\}$  independent of  $l$ , such that  $\alpha_s^* = \alpha$  for all  $s = s^\dagger, \dots, S$ . Then both the time complexity and space complexities of the MMS procedure are linear in  $l$ .*

**PROOF OF LEMMA B.2.** We show the time complexity result by counting the elementary operations (EOs). Note that the values of  $l_1, \alpha_1, \lambda$ , and  $\Delta$  are independent of  $l$ . In Step  $s$ , the algorithm computes  $J_n(sc^s)$  for every  $sc^s \in \mathcal{S}\mathcal{C}^s$ ; and for each  $sc^s$ , computing  $J_n(sc^s)$  is a quadratic programming problem with a fixed number of unknowns and constraint (from  $\Pi$ ). By definition,  $\|G_{n,sc^s}(\cdot)\|^2 = \|G_{n,sc^{s-1}}(\cdot)\|^2 + \|G_{n,sc^{s \setminus (s-1)}}(\cdot)\|^2$ , where  $sc^{s \setminus (s-1)}$  is a subselection vector that selects the moments selected by  $sc^s$  but not  $sc^{s-1}$ . Because the function  $\|G_{n,sc^{s-1}}(\cdot)\|^2$  is stored in Step  $(s-1)$ , the number of EOs in computing  $\|G_{n,sc^s}(\cdot)\|^2$  only depends on that in computing  $\|G_{n,sc^{s \setminus (s-1)}}(\cdot)\|^2$ , which depends solely on  $\Delta$ . Therefore, the number of EOs for computing  $J_n(sc^s)$  for every  $sc^s \in \mathcal{S}\mathcal{C}^s$  is  $\beta|\mathcal{S}\mathcal{C}^s|$ , where  $\beta < \infty$  is a constant independent of  $l$ . Next, the algorithm sorts  $J_n(sc^s)$ . The sorting process involves  $|\mathcal{S}\mathcal{C}^s|^2$  number of EOs. The comparison between  $J_n(sc^s)$  and  $n^\lambda$  in each step takes place  $|\mathcal{S}\mathcal{C}^s|$  times at most. Thus, there are  $(\beta+1)|\mathcal{S}\mathcal{C}^s| + |\mathcal{S}\mathcal{C}^s|^2$  number of EOs in Step  $s$  for  $s = 1, \dots, S$ . The number of EOs in Step  $(S+1)$  can be computed in the same way, except that the algorithm only searches for the minimum of  $|\mathcal{C}_n|$  values rather than sorts them. Thus,  $(\beta+1)|\mathcal{C}_n|$  number of EOs are needed. In total, there are  $\sum_{s=1}^S (\gamma|\mathcal{S}\mathcal{C}^s| + |\mathcal{S}\mathcal{C}^s|^2) + \gamma|\mathcal{C}_n|$  number of EOs, with  $\gamma \equiv \beta + 1$ .

In Step  $s$  for  $s = 1, \dots, S$ , the input set  $\mathcal{S}\mathcal{C}^s$  has cardinality  $2^{l_s-1} \prod_{i=1}^{s-1} \alpha_i^*$ . For  $s = 1, \dots, S$ ,  $l_s = l_1 + (s-1)\Delta$ . We have  $|\mathcal{S}\mathcal{C}^1| = 2^{l_1-1}$  and  $|\mathcal{S}\mathcal{C}^s| = 2^{l_s-1} \prod_{i=1}^{s-1} \alpha_i^* \leq 2^{l_1+(s-1)\Delta-1}$  for  $s = 2, \dots, s^\dagger$ . Therefore,

$$\sum_{s=1}^{s^\dagger} (\gamma|\mathcal{S}\mathcal{C}^s| + |\mathcal{S}\mathcal{C}^s|^2) \leq \sum_{s=1}^{s^\dagger} (\gamma 2^{l_1+(s-1)\Delta-1} + 4^{l_1+(s-1)\Delta-1}) \equiv T_1.$$

For  $s = s^\dagger, \dots, S$ ,  $\alpha_s^* = \alpha = 2^{-\Delta}$ . Thus, for  $s = s^\dagger + 1, \dots, S$ , it holds that  $|\mathcal{S}\mathcal{C}^s| \leq 2^{l_s-1} \prod_{i=s^\dagger}^{s-1} \alpha_i^* = 2^{l_1+(s-1)\Delta-1} (2^{-\Delta})^{(s-s^\dagger)} = 2^{l_1+(s^\dagger-1)\Delta-1}$ . As a result, we have that

$$\begin{aligned} \sum_{s=s^\dagger+1}^S (\gamma |\mathcal{S}\mathcal{C}^s| + |\mathcal{S}\mathcal{C}^s|^2) &\leq \sum_{s=s^\dagger+1}^S (\gamma 2^{l_1+(s^\dagger-1)\Delta-1} + 4^{l_1+(s^\dagger-1)\Delta-1}) \\ &\leq (S - s^\dagger) (\gamma 2^{l_1+(s^\dagger-1)\Delta-1} + 4^{l_1+(s^\dagger-1)\Delta-1}) \equiv T_2, \end{aligned}$$

where the second inequality holds because the summands are independent of  $s$ . The input set  $\mathcal{C}_n$  in Step  $(S + 1)$  has cardinality  $2^{l-1} \prod_{i=1}^S \alpha_i^*$ . Let  $\Delta_f \equiv l - [l_1 + (S - 1)\Delta]$ . Because  $\alpha_s^* = \alpha = 2^{-\Delta}$  for  $s = s^\dagger, \dots, S$ ,  $2^{l-1} \prod_{i=1}^S \alpha_i^* \leq 2^{l_1+(s^\dagger-2)\Delta+\Delta_f-1}$ . We obtain that

$$\gamma |\mathcal{C}_n| \leq \gamma 2^{l_1+(s^\dagger-2)\Delta+\Delta_f-1} \leq \gamma 2^{l_1+(s^\dagger-1)\Delta-1} \equiv T_3,$$

where the inequality holds because  $\Delta_f \leq \Delta$ . The number of EOs is no more than  $T_1 + T_2 + T_3$ . Since  $l_\pi, l_1 < l$ , and  $\Delta$  are fixed,  $T_1$  and  $T_3$  are constants of  $l$ . In fact, only  $S$  depends on  $l$ . Because  $S < \frac{l-l_1}{\Delta} + 1$  by definition, we obtain that

$$T_2 < \left( \frac{l-l_1}{\Delta} + 1 - s^\dagger \right) (\gamma 2^{l_1+(s^\dagger-1)\Delta-1} + 4^{l_1+(s^\dagger-1)\Delta-1}).$$

Since  $s^\dagger$  is a constant by assumption,  $T_2$  grows at most linearly in  $l$ . Hence, we have shown that the number of EOs needed to perform the MMS procedure is linear in  $l$ . The first claim of the lemma follows.

Since in each step, the algorithm stores  $|\mathcal{S}\mathcal{C}^s|$  number of values, the space complexity is  $\sum_{s=1}^S |\mathcal{S}\mathcal{C}^s|$ . Following from the similar calculation as above, we obtain that the space complexity of the MMS procedure is also linear in  $l$ .  $\square$

**LEMMA B.3.** *Define  $\mathcal{Q} \equiv [0, 1]^{6l}$  as the set of CCPs constituting the moment functions  $G(\cdot)$ . Let Assumptions 2.1–2.6 and 3.1 hold. With probability approaching one as  $n \rightarrow \infty$ , for all possible CCPs in  $\mathcal{Q}$  except for a set of Lebesgue measure zero, both the time complexity and space complexity of the MMS procedure are linear in  $l$ .*

**PROOF OF LEMMA B.3.** We prove the lemma by showing that the assumption in Lemma B.2 holds with probability approaching one as  $n \rightarrow \infty$ . The assumption holds if  $J_n^\alpha > n^\lambda$  at Step  $s$  for every  $s = s^\dagger, \dots, S$ , because  $\alpha_s^* = \alpha$  whenever  $J_n^\alpha > n^\lambda$ . Since  $\lambda < 0$ ,  $n^\lambda \rightarrow 0$  as  $n \rightarrow \infty$ . For any  $sc \in \mathbb{R}^{2l}$  consisting of zeros and ones, let  $G_{sc}(\cdot)$  denote the moment functions selected by  $sc$ . The proof for Theorem 3.1 shows that under Assumptions 2.1–2.6 and 3.1, Assumption (iii) in Lemma B.1 holds. Following the similar argument, it holds that  $J_n(sc) = \min_{\pi \in \Pi} \|G_{n,sc}(\pi)\|^2 \xrightarrow{P} \min_{\pi \in \Pi} \|G_{sc}(\pi)\|^2$ . Therefore, if  $\min_{\pi \in \Pi} \|G_{sc}(\pi)\|^2 \neq 0$ , then  $\Pr(J_n(sc) > n^\lambda) \rightarrow 1$  as  $n \rightarrow \infty$ .

For any  $sc^s \in \mathcal{S}\mathcal{C}^s$ ,  $G_{sc^s}(\pi)$  contains  $l_s$  number of moments. By (2.10) in Fan, Jiang, and Shi (2024),  $G_{sc^s}(\pi) \equiv \bar{\pi}_{sc^s} - \Gamma_{sc^s} \pi$ , where  $\bar{\pi}_{sc^s} \in \mathbb{R}^{l_s}$ ,  $\Gamma_{sc^s} \in \mathbb{R}^{l_s \times l_\pi}$ , and  $l_\pi = 4$ .  $\min_{\pi \in \Pi} \|G_{sc^s}(\pi)\|^2 \neq 0$  if and only if  $\text{rank}([\bar{\pi}_{sc^s}, \Gamma_{sc^s}]) > \text{rank}(\Gamma_{sc^s})$ . Define  $\mathcal{P} \equiv \{\mathfrak{p} : \mathfrak{p} \in [0, 1]^{2l_s}\}$  as the set of CCPs constituting  $\Gamma_{sc^s}$  defined in (2.9). Elements in  $\Gamma_{sc^s}$  can be

presented as a map  $M : \mathcal{P} \rightarrow [0, 1]^{l_s \times l_\pi}$ . Define another map  $R(\mathbf{p}) \equiv \text{rank}(M(\mathbf{p}))$  for every  $\mathbf{p} \in \mathcal{P}$ . We aim to show that at any Step  $s$  such that  $l_s > l_\pi$ , the set  $\mathcal{P} \setminus \mathcal{P}_r$ , where  $\mathcal{P}_r \equiv \{\mathbf{p} \in \mathcal{P} : R(\mathbf{p}) = l_\pi\}$ , has Lebesgue measure zero in  $\mathcal{P}$ .

Partition  $\Gamma_{sc^s}^\top$  as  $[\Gamma_{sc^s}^1, \Gamma_{sc^s}^2]$ , where  $\Gamma_{sc^s}^1 \in \mathbb{R}^{l_\pi \times l_\pi}$  and  $\Gamma_{sc^s}^2 \in \mathbb{R}^{l_\pi \times (l_s - l_\pi)}$ . Define a set  $\mathcal{P}^1 \equiv \{\mathbf{p}^1 : \mathbf{p}^1 \in [0, 1]^{2l_\pi}\}$ . Similar to  $\Gamma_{sc^s}$ ,  $\Gamma_{sc^s}^1$  can be presented as a map:  $M^1 : \mathcal{P}^1 \rightarrow [0, 1]^{l_\pi \times l_\pi}$ . Let  $\det^\dagger(\mathbf{p}^1) \equiv \det(M^1(\mathbf{p}^1))$  for every  $\mathbf{p}^1 \in \mathcal{P}^1$ . For  $\mathcal{P}_r^1 \equiv \{\mathbf{p}^1 \in \mathcal{P}^1 : \det^\dagger(\mathbf{p}^1) \neq 0\}$ , we first to show that the set  $\mathcal{P}^1 \setminus \mathcal{P}_r^1$  has Lebesgue measure zero in  $\mathcal{P}^1$ . By the Leibniz formula,  $\det^\dagger(\mathbf{p}^1)$  defines a polynomial function on  $[0, 1]^{2l_\pi}$ . We have that  $\det^\dagger(\mathbf{p}^{1*}) \neq 0$  for some

$$\mathbf{p}^{1*} \equiv [p_2(\mathbf{z}^1, k_1), p_3(\mathbf{z}^1, k_1), \dots, p_2(\mathbf{z}^{l_\pi}, k_{l_\pi}), p_3(\mathbf{z}^{l_\pi}, k_{l_\pi})]^\top,$$

where  $k_1, \dots, k_{l_\pi}$  are the latent states selected by  $sc^s$ . In algebraic geometry, the set  $\mathcal{P}^1 \setminus \mathcal{P}_r^1$  is defined as a proper subvariety, and must be of Lebesgue measure zero in  $\mathcal{P}^1$ . For more discussion on the algebraic geometry, especially the algebraic variety, see [Cox, Little, and O'Shea \(2013\)](#). In fact,  $\mathcal{P}_r^1$  is generic in  $\mathcal{P}^1$ . We explore the genericity result for the rest of the proof.

By the property of generic sets, it holds that

$$\mathcal{P}_r^1 \times [0, 1]^{2(l_s - l_\pi)} \equiv \{(\mathbf{p}^1, \mathbf{p}^2) : \mathbf{p}^1 \in \mathcal{P}_r^1, \mathbf{p}^2 \in [0, 1]^{2(l_s - l_\pi)}\}$$

is generic in  $\mathcal{P}$ . As a result,  $\mathcal{P}_t \equiv \{(\mathbf{p}^1, \mathbf{p}^2) \in [0, 1]^{2l_s} : \det^\dagger(\mathbf{p}^1) \neq 0\}$  is generic in  $\mathcal{P}$ . Since  $\det(\Gamma_{sc^s}^1) \neq 0$  is equivalent to  $\text{rank}(\Gamma_{sc^s}^1) = l_\pi$ ,  $\text{rank}(\Gamma_{sc^s}) = l_\pi$  holds if  $\det(\Gamma_{sc^s}^1) \neq 0$ . We have that  $\mathcal{P}_t \subset \mathcal{P}_r$ . Hence,  $\mathcal{P}_r$  is generic in  $\mathcal{P}$ , which implies that  $\mathcal{P} \setminus \mathcal{P}_r$  has Lebesgue measure zero in  $\mathcal{P}$ .

Next, we show that the set of CCPs constituting  $G_{sc^s}(\cdot)$  such that  $\text{rank}([\overline{\pi}_{sc^s}, \Gamma_{sc^s}]) = l_\pi + 1$  is generic in  $\mathcal{Q}_s \equiv \{\mathbf{q} : \mathbf{q} \in [0, 1]^{3l_s}\}$ . Assumption 2.1 assumes that  $F : \mathbb{R} \rightarrow [0, 1]$  is absolutely continuous, where  $F(\cdot)$  is the distribution function. A function is said to have the Luzin's property if the image of any Lebesgue null set has again Lebesgue measure zero. By Chapter 7 in [Saks \(1937\)](#), for functions with bounded variation, absolute continuity is equivalent to Luzin's property. In consequence, it suffices to show that the set

$$\mathcal{PE}_r \equiv \{(\pi, \mathbf{p}) : \pi \in \mathbb{R}^{l_s}, \mathbf{p} \in [0, 1]^{2l_s}, \text{rank}([\pi, M(\mathbf{p})]) = l_\pi + 1\}$$

is generic in  $\mathcal{PE} \equiv \{(\pi, \mathbf{p}) : \pi \in \mathbb{R}^{l_s}, \mathbf{p} \in [0, 1]^{2l_s}\}$ . The proof follows the same argument as proving that  $\mathcal{P}_r$  is generic in  $\mathcal{P}$ . Thus, we obtain that the set of CCPs such that  $\text{rank}([\overline{\pi}_{sc^s}, \Gamma_{sc^s}]) > \text{rank}(\Gamma_{sc^s})$  is generic in  $\mathcal{Q}_s$ . Because  $\text{rank}([\overline{\pi}_{sc^s}, \Gamma_{sc^s}]) > \text{rank}(\Gamma_{sc^s})$  is equivalent to  $\min_{\pi \in \Pi} \|G_{sc^s}(\pi)\|^2 \neq 0$ , and  $\Pr(J_n(sc^s) > n^\lambda) \rightarrow 1$  as  $n \rightarrow \infty$  if  $\min_{\pi \in \Pi} \|G_{sc^s}(\pi)\|^2 \neq 0$  for any  $sc^s \in \mathcal{SC}^s$  and  $sc^s \neq sc_0^s$ , we conclude that the set of CCPs such that  $\alpha_s^* \neq \alpha$  w.p.  $\rightarrow 1$  as  $n \rightarrow \infty$  for any Step  $s$  with  $s = s^\dagger, \dots, S$  has Lebesgue measure zero in  $\mathcal{Q}$ , the set of all possible CCPs constituting  $G(\cdot)$ .  $\square$

**PROOF OF THEOREM 3.2.** Define  $\Pi^I$  as the parameter space of player 1's payoffs on  $z_1^I$  and some latent state such that Assumptions 2.1–2.6 hold. Since the space of payoffs for all three players is a Cartesian product of spaces for each player on each observed and latent states, it suffices to show that player 1's "exceptional" payoffs have zero Lebesgue

measure in  $\Pi^I$ . Recall the definition of  $\mathcal{Q}$  in Lemma B.3. Define  $\mathcal{Q}^I \subseteq \mathcal{Q}$  such that elements in  $\mathcal{Q}^I$  are CCPs in the Simple Game for all three players holding  $z_1 = z_1^1$  and that Assumptions 2.1–2.6 are satisfied. By definition, elements in  $\mathcal{Q}^I$  can identify the true payoffs of player 1 under the correct matching. Lemma B.3 implies that for any  $s$  with  $l_s > l_\pi$  and  $sc^s \neq sc_0^s$ , the set of CCPs such that  $\text{rank}([\bar{\pi}_{sc^s}, \Gamma_{sc^s}]) > \text{rank}(\Gamma_{sc^s})$  does not hold has measure zero in  $\mathcal{Q}$ . Since  $\mathcal{Q}^I \subseteq \mathcal{Q}$  has nonzero Lebesgue measure, the set of such CCPs also has measure zero in  $\mathcal{Q}^I$ .

Define a map  $\mathcal{G} : \mathcal{Q}^I \rightarrow \Pi^I$  that maps the CCPs to the true payoff. The map exists because elements in  $\mathcal{Q}^I$  identify the true payoff. By Lemma 7.25 in Walter (1987), Luzin's property holds if the mapping  $\mathcal{G}(p)$  is differentiable in  $p$ . Therefore, it suffices to prove that  $\mathcal{G}(p)$  is differentiable in  $p$ . The map  $\mathcal{G}$  is the solution to  $\bar{\pi}_{c_0} - \Gamma_{c_0} \pi = \mathbf{0}$  by Lemma 2.1, where both  $\bar{\pi}_{c_0}$  and  $\Gamma_{c_0}$  are functions of  $p$ . In consequence,  $\mathcal{G}(p) = \Gamma_{c_0}^+ \bar{\pi}_{c_0}$ , where  $\Gamma_{c_0}^+$  is the Moore–Penrose pseudo-inverse of  $\Gamma_{c_0}$ . We show that  $\Gamma_{c_0}^+$  and  $\bar{\pi}_{c_0}$  are both differentiable in  $p_i(\mathbf{z}, k)$  for each  $i$ ,  $\mathbf{z} \in \mathcal{Z}$ , and  $k \in \mathcal{K}$ . Without loss of generality, we can just focus on  $p_1(\mathbf{z}^1, A)$ . Because  $F(\cdot)$  is continuously differentiable and  $f(\cdot)$  is positive everywhere in  $\mathbb{R}$ , the inverse function theorem provides that  $F^{-1}(\cdot)$  is continuously differentiable in  $p_1(\mathbf{z}^1, A)$  on  $[0, 1]$ . Thus,  $\bar{\pi}_{c_0}$  is differentiable in  $p_1(\mathbf{z}^1, A)$ . Since  $\Gamma_{c_0}$  has full column rank,  $\Gamma_{c_0}^+ = (\Gamma_{c_0}^\top \Gamma_{c_0})^{-1} \Gamma_{c_0}^\top$ . By the definition of  $\Gamma$  in (2.9) in Fan, Jiang, and Shi (2024),  $\Gamma_{c_0}$  is differentiable in  $p_1(\mathbf{z}^1, A)$ . Hence,  $\mathcal{G}(p)$  is differentiable in  $p$ . The claimed result in the theorem holds.  $\square$

### B.3 Proofs of results in Section 4

Theorem 4.1 is proved based upon Lemmas B.4–B.7.

LEMMA B.4. *Let Assumptions 2.1–2.6 and the following assumptions hold for the Simple Game. For any parameter sequence  $\xi_n \in \Xi_R(\xi)$  with any  $\xi \in \Xi_R$ : (i)  $\sqrt{n}(G_n(\pi) - G(\pi)) \xrightarrow{d} N(0, \Omega(\pi))$  with some positive definite covariance matrix  $\Omega(\pi)$  for any  $\pi \in \Pi$ ; (ii) for any  $c \in \mathcal{C}_n$ ,  $W_n(c) = W(c) + o_p(1)$  with  $W(c)$  being positive definite; and (iii)  $W(c_0) = \Omega_0^{-1}$  for  $\Omega_0$  being the asymptotic variance of  $\sqrt{n}(G_{n,c_0}(\pi_0) - G_{c_0}(\pi_0))$ . Then  $\limsup_{n \rightarrow \infty} \sup_{\xi \in \Xi_R} \Pr_\xi(T_n > \chi_{[l-l_\pi+l_R], 1-\alpha}^2) = \alpha$ .*

PROOF OF LEMMA B.4. First, we show that  $\limsup_{n \rightarrow \infty} \sup_{\xi \in \Xi_R} \Pr_\xi(c_0 \in \mathcal{C}_n) \rightarrow 1$ . Second, we prove that  $\limsup_{n \rightarrow \infty} \sup_{\xi \in \Xi_R} \Pr_\xi(T_n > \chi_{[l-l_\pi+l_R], 1-\alpha}^2) = \alpha$  if  $c_0 \in \mathcal{C}_n$ .

For  $s = 1, \dots, S$ , let  $sc_0^s \in \mathcal{S}\mathcal{C}^s$  denote the subselection vector whose first  $2l_s$  elements are the same as  $c_0$ . We first show that  $\limsup_{n \rightarrow \infty} \sup_{\xi \in \Xi_R} \Pr_\xi(sc_0^1 \in \mathcal{S}\mathcal{C}_n^1) \rightarrow 1$ . By Assumptions 2.1–2.6, Lemma 2.1 holds, and we have that  $G_{c_0}(\pi_0) = \mathbf{0}$ . Together with Assumption (i), we can obtain that for any  $\xi \in \Xi_R$  and the parameter sequence  $\{\xi_n\} \in \Xi_R(\xi)$ ,  $\|G_{n,c_0}(\pi_0)\|^2 = O_p(n^{-1})$  and  $\|G_{n,sc_0^1}(\pi_0)\|^2 = O_p(n^{-1})$ . Therefore, it holds that  $J_n(sc_0^1) \leq \|G_{n,sc_0^1}(\pi_0)\|^2 = O_p(n^{-1})$  for any  $\xi \in \Xi_R$  and the parameter sequence  $\{\xi_n\} \in \Xi_R(\xi)$ . We can further obtain that for any  $\lambda > -1$ ,

$$1 \geq \limsup_{n \rightarrow \infty} \sup_{\xi \in \Xi_R} \Pr_\xi(sc_0^1 \in \mathcal{S}\mathcal{C}_n^1) \geq \limsup_{n \rightarrow \infty} \sup_{\xi \in \Xi_R} \Pr_\xi(J_n(sc_0^1) \leq n^\lambda) \rightarrow 1,$$



where the second inequality holds for any  $\alpha_1 > 0$ , because  $\mathcal{S}\mathcal{C}_n^1$  can contain  $sc^1$ 's such that  $J_n(sc) > n^\lambda$ . Thus, we obtain that  $\limsup_{n \rightarrow \infty} \sup_{\xi \in \Xi_R} \Pr_\xi(sc_0^1 \in \mathcal{S}\mathcal{C}_n^1) \rightarrow 1$ .

The convergence  $\limsup_{n \rightarrow \infty} \sup_{\xi \in \Xi_R} \Pr_\xi(sc_0^2 \in \mathcal{S}\mathcal{C}_n^2) \rightarrow 1$  holds if

$$\limsup_{n \rightarrow \infty} \sup_{\xi \in \Xi_R} \Pr_\xi(sc_0^2 \in \mathcal{S}\mathcal{C}_n^2 | sc_0^2 \in \mathcal{S}\mathcal{C}^2) \rightarrow 1$$

and  $\limsup_{n \rightarrow \infty} \sup_{\xi \in \Xi_R} \Pr_\xi(sc_0^2 \in \mathcal{S}\mathcal{C}^2) \rightarrow 1$ . The former holds by the same proof as above and the latter holds because  $sc_0^2 \in \mathcal{S}\mathcal{C}^2$  occurs if and only if  $sc_0^1 \in \mathcal{S}\mathcal{C}_n^1$  occurs. We can obtain that  $\limsup_{n \rightarrow \infty} \sup_{\xi \in \Xi_R} \Pr_\xi(sc_0^S \in \mathcal{S}\mathcal{C}_n^S) \rightarrow 1$  by sequentially applying this argument. Because the event  $sc_0^S \in \mathcal{S}\mathcal{C}_n^S$  occurs if and only if  $c_0 \in \mathcal{C}_n$  occurs, it holds that  $\limsup_{n \rightarrow \infty} \sup_{\xi \in \Xi_R} \Pr_\xi(c_0 \in \mathcal{C}_n) \rightarrow 1$ .

In the next step, we show that  $\limsup_{n \rightarrow \infty} \sup_{\xi \in \Xi_R} \Pr_\xi(T_n > \chi_{[l-l_\pi+l_R], 1-\alpha}^2) = \alpha$  if the event  $c_0 \in \mathcal{C}_n$  occurs. We prove the result in two cases:  $l_R < l_\pi$  and  $l_R = l_\pi$ . When  $l_R < l_\pi$ , the null space of  $R$  has dimension  $l_\pi - l_R$ . Let  $\Psi$  be a  $l_\pi \times (l_\pi - l_R)$  matrix storing a basis of the null space. Then there exists  $\pi_f \in R^{l_\pi - l_R}$  and  $\mu$  such that any  $\pi$  satisfying  $H_0$  can be written as  $\pi = \Psi\pi_f + \mu$ . By imposing  $H_0$  on the sample moment functions, we obtain that

$$G_{n,c}(\pi) = G_{n,c}(\Psi\pi_f + \mu) = \bar{\pi}_{n,c} - \Gamma_{n,c}\mu - \Gamma_{n,c}\Psi\pi_f.$$

Define  $\hat{\pi}_f(c) \equiv \arg \min_{\pi_f} \|G_{n,c}(\Psi\pi_f + \mu)\|_{W_n(c)}^2$  for any  $c \in \mathcal{C}_n$ , where  $W_n(c) = W(c) + o_p(1)$  by Assumption (ii). Define  $\pi_f^*(c) \equiv \text{plim}_{n \rightarrow \infty} \hat{\pi}_f(c)$ . For each given  $c \in \mathcal{C}_n$ , we have the solution  $\hat{\pi}_f(c)$  to the minimum-distance problem with a corresponding ‘‘pseudo-true’’ value  $\pi_f^*(c)$  defined as its probability limit. The ‘‘pseudo-true’’ value at  $c_0$  delivers the true value as  $\pi_0 = \Psi\pi_f^*(c_0) + \mu$  for any parameter sequence  $\xi_n \in \Xi_R(\xi)$ . Our test statistic  $T_n$  is equivalent to  $\min_{c \in \mathcal{C}_n} n \|G_{n,c}(\Psi\hat{\pi}_f(c) + \mu)\|_{W_n(c)}^2$ . We aim to show that the test based upon the test statistic  $T_n$  and the critical value  $\chi_{[l-l_\pi+l_R], 1-\alpha}^2$  controls the asymptotic size when  $c_0 \in \mathcal{C}_n$ . For this purpose, we derive its asymptotic distribution under drifting model parameter sequences. To simplify the discussion, we omit ‘‘under any  $\xi \in \Xi_R$  and the parameter sequence  $\{\xi_n\} \in \Xi_R(\xi)$ ’’ with the understanding that all the derivations are for any  $\xi \in \Xi_R$  and the parameter sequence  $\{\xi_n\} \in \Xi_R(\xi)$ .

Apply mean value expansion of  $G_{n,c_0}(\Psi\hat{\pi}_f(c_0) + \mu)$  at  $\pi_f^*(c_0)$ . We can obtain that

$$G_{n,c_0}(\Psi\hat{\pi}_f(c_0) + \mu) = G_{n,c_0}(\Psi\pi_f^*(c_0) + \mu) - \Gamma_{n,c_0}\Psi(\hat{\pi}_f(c_0) - \pi_f^*(c_0)). \quad (\text{B.3})$$

Let  $a_{n,c_0} \equiv \Gamma_{n,c_0}\Psi$ . By construction,  $\hat{\pi}_f(c_0)$  satisfies the following first-order condition:

$$a_{n,c_0}^\top W_n(c_0) G_{n,c_0}(\Psi\hat{\pi}_f(c_0) + \mu) = 0.$$

Multiply both sides of (B.3) by  $a_{n,c_0}^\top W_n(c_0)$ . We obtain that

$$\begin{aligned} & a_{n,c_0}^\top W_n(c_0) G_{n,c_0}(\Psi\hat{\pi}_f(c_0) + \mu) \\ &= a_{n,c_0}^\top W_n(c_0) G_{n,c_0}(\Psi\pi_f^*(c_0) + \mu) - a_{n,c_0}^\top W_n(c_0) a_{n,c_0} (\hat{\pi}_f(c_0) - \pi_f^*(c_0)). \end{aligned}$$

By Assumption 2.6,  $\Gamma_{c_0}$  has full row rank. Together with Assumption (i), we obtain that  $\Gamma_{n,c_0}$  has full row rank with probability approaching one for any parameter sequence.



Thus,  $a_{n,c_0}^\top W_n(c_0) a_{n,c_0}$  is invertible with probability approaching one. After rearrangement, we have that

$$\begin{aligned} (\widehat{\pi}_f(c_0) - \pi_f^*(c_0)) &= (a_{n,c_0}^\top W_n(c_0) a_{n,c_0})^{-1} a_{n,c_0}^\top W_n(c_0) G_{n,c_0} (\Psi \pi_f^*(c_0) + \mu) \\ &\quad - (a_{n,c_0}^\top W_n(c_0) a_{n,c_0})^{-1} a_{n,c_0}^\top W_n(c_0) G_{n,c_0} (\Psi \widehat{\pi}_f(c_0) + \mu) \\ &= (a_{n,c_0}^\top W_n(c_0) a_{n,c_0})^{-1} a_{n,c_0}^\top W_n(c_0) G_{n,c_0} (\pi_0), \end{aligned} \quad (\text{B.4})$$

where the last equality follows from the first-order condition. Multiply both sides of (B.4) with  $a_{n,c_0}$ , we get that

$$\begin{aligned} a_{n,c_0} (\widehat{\pi}_f(c_0) - \pi_f^*(c_0)) \\ = a_{n,c_0} (a_{n,c_0}^\top W_n(c_0) a_{n,c_0})^{-1} a_{n,c_0}^\top W_n(c_0) G_{n,c_0} (\pi_0). \end{aligned} \quad (\text{B.5})$$

Combining (B.3) with (B.5), we have that

$$\begin{aligned} \sqrt{n} (G_{n,c_0} (\Psi \widehat{\pi}_f(c_0) + \mu) - G_{n,c_0} (\pi_0)) \\ = -a_{n,c_0} \sqrt{n} (\widehat{\pi}_f(c_0) - \pi_f^*(c_0)) \\ = -a_{n,c_0} (a_{n,c_0}^\top W_n(c_0) a_{n,c_0})^{-1} a_{n,c_0}^\top W_n(c_0) \sqrt{n} G_{n,c_0} (\pi_0). \end{aligned}$$

Let  $I_l$  be the identify matrix of dimension  $l$ . It then holds that

$$\begin{aligned} \sqrt{n} G_{n,c_0} (\Psi \widehat{\pi}_f(c_0) + \mu) \\ = (I_l - a_{n,c_0} \Psi (a_{n,c_0}^\top W_n(c_0) a_{n,c_0})^{-1} a_{n,c_0}^\top W_n(c_0)) \sqrt{n} G_{n,c_0} (\pi_0). \end{aligned}$$

Because  $\Gamma_{n,c_0} = \Gamma_{c_0} + o_p(1)$  by Assumption (i), we have  $a_{n,c_0} = \Gamma_{c_0} \Psi + o_p(1) \equiv a_{c_0} + o_p(1)$ . Together with  $W_n(c_0) = W(c_0) + o_p(1) = \Omega_0^{-1} + o_p(1)$  by Assumptions (i) and (iii), we have that

$$(I_l - a_{n,c_0} (a_{n,c_0}^\top W_n(c_0) a_{n,c_0})^{-1} a_{n,c_0}^\top W_n(c_0)) = (I_l - a_{c_0} (a_{c_0}^\top \Omega_0^{-1} a_{c_0})^{-1} a_{c_0}^\top \Omega_0^{-1}) + o_p(1).$$

Since  $\pi_0 = \Psi \pi_f^*(c_0) + \mu$  under the null hypothesis and  $\sqrt{n} G_{n,c_0} (\pi_0) = O_p(1)$  by Assumption (i), we obtain that

$$\begin{aligned} \sqrt{n} G_{n,c_0} (\Psi \widehat{\pi}_f(c_0) + \mu) \\ = (I_l - a_{c_0} (a_{c_0}^\top \Omega_0^{-1} a_{c_0})^{-1} a_{c_0}^\top \Omega_0^{-1}) \sqrt{n} G_{n,c_0} (\pi_0) + o_p(1). \end{aligned} \quad (\text{B.6})$$

By Assumptions (ii) and (iii),  $\Omega_0^{-1}$  is symmetric and positive definite. As a result, it admits a Cholesky decomposition:  $\Omega_0^{-1} = A^\top A$ . Thus, it holds that

$$\begin{aligned} n G_{n,c_0} (\Psi \widehat{\pi}_f(c_0) + \mu)^\top W_n(c_0) G_{n,c_0} (\Psi \widehat{\pi}_f(c_0) + \mu) \\ = n G_{n,c_0} (\Psi \widehat{\pi}_f(c_0) + \mu)^\top \Omega_0^{-1} G_{n,c_0} (\Psi \widehat{\pi}_f(c_0) + \mu) + o_p(1) \\ = (A \sqrt{n} G_{n,c_0} (\Psi \widehat{\pi}_f(c_0) + \mu))^\top (A \sqrt{n} G_{n,c_0} (\Psi \widehat{\pi}_f(c_0) + \mu)) + o_p(1). \end{aligned}$$

Since  $\Omega_0 = A^{-1}(A^\top)^{-1}$ , Assumption (i) and Lemma 2.1 imply that

$$\sqrt{n}G_{n,c_0}(\pi_0) \xrightarrow{d} N(0, \Omega_0) \stackrel{d}{=} A^{-1}Z,$$

where  $Z \sim N(0, I_l)$ . Together with (B.6), we obtain that

$$\begin{aligned} A\sqrt{n}G_{n,c_0}(\Psi\widehat{\pi}_f(c_0) + \mu) &\xrightarrow{d} A(I_l - a_{c_0}(a_{c_0}^\top\Omega_0^{-1}a_{c_0})^{-1}a_{c_0}^\top\Omega_0^{-1})A^{-1}Z \\ &= (I_l - Aa_{c_0}(a_{c_0}^\top\Omega_0^{-1}a_{c_0})^{-1}a_{c_0}^\top A^\top)Z. \end{aligned}$$

It is easy to verify that the matrix in front of  $Z$  in the above expression is symmetric and idempotent. It has the rank  $l - l_\pi + l_R$  verified by the following derivation:

$$\begin{aligned} &\text{rank}[(I_l - Aa_{c_0}(a_{c_0}^\top\Omega_0^{-1}a_{c_0})^{-1}a_{c_0}^\top A^\top)] \\ &= \text{trace}[(I_l - Aa_{c_0}(a_{c_0}^\top\Omega_0^{-1}a_{c_0})^{-1}a_{c_0}^\top A^\top)] \\ &= \text{trace}(I_l) - \text{trace}(Aa_{c_0}(a_{c_0}^\top\Omega_0^{-1}a_{c_0})^{-1}a_{c_0}^\top A^\top) \\ &= \text{trace}(I_l) - \text{trace}(a_{c_0}^\top A^\top Aa_{c_0}(a_{c_0}^\top\Omega_0^{-1}a_{c_0})^{-1}) \\ &= l - l_\pi + l_R, \end{aligned}$$

where the first equality follows from the property of idempotent matrix and third equality follows from the invariance property of trace under cyclic permutations. Thus, we obtain that for any  $\xi \in \Xi_R$  and the parameter sequence  $\{\xi_n\} \in \Xi_R(\xi)$ ,

$$\min_{R\pi=r} \|\sqrt{n}G_{n,c_0}(\pi)\|_{W_n(c_0)}^2 = n \|G_{n,c_0}(\Psi\widehat{\pi}_f(c_0) + \mu)\|_{W_n(c_0)}^2 \xrightarrow{d} \chi_{[l-l_\pi+l_R]}^2.$$

By the definition of test statistic in (4.2) in Fan, Jiang, and Shi (2024), it holds that  $T_n \leq \min_{R\pi=r} \|\sqrt{n}G_{n,c_0}(\pi)\|_{W_n(c_0)}^2$ . Therefore,  $T_n$  is asymptotically stochastically dominated by  $\chi_{[l-l_\pi+l_R]}^2$ . Moreover, for some  $\xi \in \Xi_R$  and the parameter sequence  $\{\xi_n\} \in \Xi_R(\xi)$  such that each element in  $\lim_{n \rightarrow \infty} \sqrt{n}G_{n,c}(\pi)$  is infinite for every  $c \neq c_0$ ,  $T_n \xrightarrow{d} \chi_{[l-l_\pi+l_R]}^2$ . Thus, if  $c_0 \in \mathcal{C}_n$ , using the  $(1 - \alpha)$ th quantile of  $\chi_{[l-(l_\pi-l_R)]}^2$  denoted as  $\chi_{[l-(l_\pi-l_R)], 1-\alpha}^2$  achieves asymptotic size control:

$$\limsup_{n \rightarrow \infty} \sup_{\xi \in \Xi_R} \Pr_\xi(T_n > \chi_{[l-(l_\pi-l_R)], 1-\alpha}^2 | c_0 \in \mathcal{C}_n) = \alpha.$$

The proof for the case where  $l_R = l_\pi$  is the same with  $\pi = R^{-1}r$ . Therefore, combining with  $\limsup_{n \rightarrow \infty} \sup_{\xi \in \Xi_R} \Pr_\xi(c_0 \in \mathcal{C}_n) \rightarrow 1$ , the lemma holds.  $\square$

**LEMMA B.5.** *Let Lemma 2.1 and the following assumptions hold for the Simple Game: (i) for any  $\pi \in \Pi$ ,  $G_n(\pi) = G(\pi) + O_p(n^{-1/2})$ ; (ii) for any  $c \in \mathcal{C}_n$ ,  $W_n(c) = W(c) + o_p(1)$  with  $W(c)$  being positive definite; and (iii) for any  $c \in \mathcal{C}_n$ ,  $\min_{\pi \in \Pi} \|G_{n,c}(\pi)\|_{W_n(c)}^2 \xrightarrow{p} \min_{\pi \in \Pi} \|G_c(\pi)\|_{W(c)}^2$ . Then it holds that for any  $\xi \notin \Xi_R$ ,  $\lim_{n \rightarrow \infty} \Pr_\xi(T_n > \chi_{[l-l_\pi+l_R], 1-\alpha}^2) = 1$ .*

PROOF OF LEMMA B.5. When  $\xi \notin \Xi_R$ , it is straightforward to see that for all  $c \in \mathcal{C}$ ,  $\min_{R\pi=r} \|\sqrt{n}G_{n,c}(\pi)\|_{W_n(c)}^2$  diverges to infinity under Lemma 2.1 and Assumption (i)–(iii). Since  $\chi_{[l-l_\pi+l_R],1-\alpha}^2$  is finite, it holds that  $\lim_{n \rightarrow \infty} \Pr_\xi(T_n > \chi_{[l-l_\pi+l_R],1-\alpha}^2) = 1$ . Thus, the lemma follows.  $\square$

PROOF OF THEOREM 4.1. We prove the theorem by verifying the conditions in Lemmas B.4 and B.5. Lemma 2.1 holds by Assumptions 2.1–2.6. It suffices to show that Assumptions (i)–(iii) in Lemma B.4 hold for the first part of the theorem and Assumptions (i)–(iii) in Lemma B.5 hold for the second part of the theorem.

First, we show that the moment functions for the Simple Game admits an asymptotic linear representation under drifting sequences. Without loss of generality, we prove it for player 1. The proof of asymptotic linear representation builds on two lemmas provided after this proof. We first focus on finding the asymptotic linear representation for the first observed state  $\mathbf{z} = \mathbf{z}^1$ , denoted as  $G_{nz^1}(\pi)$ , and then stack the asymptotic linear representations of  $G_{nz}(\pi)$  for  $\mathbf{z} = \mathbf{z}^1, \dots, \mathbf{z}^l$  in the end to obtain the asymptotic linear representation for  $G_n(\pi)$ . Because we have fixed the player and the observed state variable, from now on we will suppress the subscript  $i$ ,  $z_i$ , and  $\mathbf{z}$  when there is no confusion. With slight abuse of notation, define the  $6 \times 1$  vector of equilibrium CCPs and its estimator as

$$p_{\mathbf{z}^1} \equiv [p_1(\mathbf{z}^1, k), p_1(\mathbf{z}^1, k'), \dots, p_3(\mathbf{z}^1, k), p_3(\mathbf{z}^1, k')]^\top \equiv [p_1, \dots, p_6]^\top \quad \text{and} \quad (\text{B.7})$$

$$\widehat{p}_{\mathbf{z}^1} \equiv [\widehat{p}_1, \dots, \widehat{p}_6]^\top.$$

Let  $\overline{\pi}_{\mathbf{z}^1} \equiv [F^{-1}(p_1(\mathbf{z}^1, k)), F^{-1}(p_1(\mathbf{z}^1, k'))]^\top$  be the  $2 \times 1$  equilibrium expected payoff vector, and define  $\overline{\pi}_{nz^1}$  as the estimated expected payoff vector. The matrix storing the true joint probabilities of opponents' actions is  $\Gamma_{\mathbf{z}^1} = \begin{bmatrix} \mathbf{p}_{-1}(\mathbf{z}^1, k)^\top & \mathbf{p}_{-1}(\mathbf{z}^1, k')^\top \end{bmatrix}^\top$ . The estimated matrix for opponents' actions is denoted as  $\Gamma_{nz^1}$ . Then  $G_{nz^1}(\pi) = \overline{\pi}_{nz^1} - \Gamma_{nz^1}\pi$ . Let the  $8 \times 1$  vector  $a_{\mathbf{z}^1}$  denote the free joint probabilities in the contingency table (conditional on  $\mathbf{z} = \mathbf{z}^1$ ), and let the  $9 \times 1$  vector  $q_{\mathbf{z}^1}$  denote the free unconditional joint probabilities that generate the contingency table on  $\mathbf{z}^1$ :<sup>2</sup>

$$a_{\mathbf{z}^1} \equiv [a_1, \dots, a_8]^\top \quad \text{and} \quad q_{\mathbf{z}^1} \equiv [q_1, \dots, q_9]^\top, \quad \text{where} \quad (\text{B.8})$$

$$a_1 \equiv \Pr([d_1, d_2, d_3] = [1, 1, 1] | \mathbf{z}^1), \quad a_2 \equiv \Pr([d_1, d_2, d_3] = [0, 1, 1] | \mathbf{z}^1),$$

$$a_3 \equiv \Pr([d_1, d_2, d_3] = [1, 0, 1] | \mathbf{z}^1), \quad a_4 \equiv \Pr([d_1, d_2] = [1, 1] | \mathbf{z}^1),$$

$$a_5 \equiv \Pr([d_1, d_2] = [0, 1] | \mathbf{z}^1), \quad a_6 \equiv \Pr([d_1, d_3] = [1, 1] | \mathbf{z}^1),$$

$$a_7 \equiv \Pr([d_1, d_3] = [0, 1] | \mathbf{z}^1), \quad a_8 \equiv \Pr(d_1 = 1 | \mathbf{z}^1) \quad \text{and} \quad (\text{B.9})$$

$$q_1 \equiv \Pr([d_1, d_2, d_3] = [1, 1, 1], \mathbf{z} = \mathbf{z}^1), \dots,$$

$$q_8 \equiv \Pr(d_1 = 1, \mathbf{z} = \mathbf{z}^1), \quad q_9 \equiv \Pr(\mathbf{z} = \mathbf{z}^1). \quad (\text{B.10})$$

<sup>2</sup>Note that in Supplemental Appendix C.1 although there are in total 14 probabilities in the contingency tables that generate CCPs via eigendecomposition, only 8 of them are free (not linear combinations of other probabilities):  $a_1, \dots, a_8$ .

For  $i = 1, \dots, 8$ , it holds that  $a_i = q_i/q_9$ . Note that  $q_{\mathbf{z}^1}$  includes three probabilities for the joint actions of three players on  $\mathbf{z}^1$ , two probabilities for the joint actions of player 1 and player 2 on  $\mathbf{z}^1$ , and two probabilities for the joint actions of player 1 and player 3 on  $\mathbf{z}^1$ , one probability for the action of player 1 on  $\mathbf{z}^1$ , and the probability of  $\mathbf{z} = \mathbf{z}^1$ . The estimators  $\widehat{q}_{\mathbf{z}^1}$  and  $\widehat{a}_{\mathbf{z}^1}$  are calculated as

$$\widehat{q}_{\mathbf{z}^1} = \frac{1}{n} \sum_{m=1}^n \eta_{m\mathbf{z}^1} \equiv [\widehat{q}_1, \dots, \widehat{q}_9]^\top \quad \text{and} \quad \widehat{a}_{\mathbf{z}^1} = \left[ \frac{\widehat{q}_1}{\widehat{q}_9}, \dots, \frac{\widehat{q}_8}{\widehat{q}_9} \right]^\top \equiv [\widehat{a}_1, \dots, \widehat{a}_8]^\top, \quad (\text{B.11})$$

where  $\eta_{m\mathbf{z}^1}$  is defined as

$$\eta_{m\mathbf{z}^1} \equiv \left[ \mathbb{1}([d_{1m}, d_{2m}, d_{3m}] = [1, 1, 1], \mathbf{z}_m = \mathbf{z}^1), \dots, \mathbb{1}(d_{1m} = 1, \mathbf{z}_m = \mathbf{z}^1), \mathbb{1}(\mathbf{z}_m = \mathbf{z}^1) \right]^\top. \quad (\text{B.12})$$

By Lemmas B.6 and B.7 below, the second-order Taylor expansion of  $G_{n\mathbf{z}^1}(\pi)$  at  $p_{\mathbf{z}^1}$  gives

$$\begin{aligned} \sqrt{n}(G_{n\mathbf{z}^1}(\pi) - G_{\mathbf{z}^1}(\pi)) &= \sqrt{n}D_{p\mathbf{z}^1}(\pi)(\widehat{p}_{\mathbf{z}^1} - p_{\mathbf{z}^1}) \\ &\quad + \sum_j \sum_k \frac{H_{p^*-j,k}(\pi)}{2} \sqrt{n}(\widehat{p}_j - p_j)(\widehat{p}_k - p_k), \end{aligned}$$

where

$$D_{p\mathbf{z}^1}(\pi) \equiv \begin{bmatrix} dp_{11}, \dots, dp_{16} \\ dp_{21}, \dots, dp_{26} \end{bmatrix}_{2 \times 6},$$

in which

$$\begin{aligned} dp_{11} &= \frac{1}{F'(F^{-1}(p_1(\mathbf{z}^1, k)))}, & dp_{22} &= \frac{1}{F'(F^{-1}(p_1(\mathbf{z}^1, k')))}, \\ dp_{12} &= dp_{14} = dp_{16} = dp_{21} = dp_{23} = dp_{25} = 0, \\ dp_{13} &= (p_3(\mathbf{z}^1, k), (1 - p_3(\mathbf{z}^1, k)), -p_3(\mathbf{z}^1, k), -(1 - p_3(\mathbf{z}^1, k)))\pi, \\ dp_{15} &= (p_2(\mathbf{z}^1, k), -p_2(\mathbf{z}^1, k), 1 - p_2(\mathbf{z}^1, k), -(1 - p_2(\mathbf{z}^1, k)))\pi, \\ dp_{24} &= (p_3(\mathbf{z}^1, k'), (1 - p_3(\mathbf{z}^1, k')), -p_3(\mathbf{z}^1, k'), -(1 - p_3(\mathbf{z}^1, k')))\pi, \\ dp_{26} &= (p_2(\mathbf{z}^1, k'), -p_2(\mathbf{z}^1, k'), 1 - p_2(\mathbf{z}^1, k'), -(1 - p_2(\mathbf{z}^1, k')))\pi. \end{aligned}$$

First,  $D_{p\mathbf{z}^1}(\pi)$  is of full row rank. Second, by Assumption 4.1(i), the denominators in  $dp_{11}$  and  $dp_{22}$  are bounded away from 0, and all other elements in  $D_{p\mathbf{z}^1}(\pi)$  are bounded for any  $\pi \in \Pi$ . By Assumption 3.1,  $D_{p\mathbf{z}^1}(\pi)$  is bounded uniformly over  $\Pi$ . There are only two types of nonzero elements in all Hessian vectors: payoff parameters and  $-\frac{F''(F^{-1}(p_1(\mathbf{z}^1, k)))}{[F'(F^{-1}(p_1(\mathbf{z}^1, k)))]^3}$  or  $-\frac{F''(F^{-1}(p_1(\mathbf{z}^1, k')))}{[F'(F^{-1}(p_1(\mathbf{z}^1, k')))]^3}$ . Thus, by Assumption 3.1 and 4.1(i), all elements in the Hessian vectors are bounded, that is, there exists a absolute constant  $M^*$

such that for any  $j$  and  $k$ , it holds that  $\sum_j \sum_k \left\| \frac{H_{p^*-j,k}(\pi)}{2} \right\| < M^*$ . For large enough  $n$ , the following inequality holds:

$$\begin{aligned} & \left\| \sum_j \sum_k \frac{H_{p^*-j,k}(\pi)}{2} \sqrt{n}(\widehat{p}_j - p_j)(\widehat{p}_k - p_k) \right\| \\ & \leq \sqrt{n} \sum_j \sum_k \left\| \frac{H_{p^*-j,k}(\pi)}{2} \right\| \|\widehat{p}_{z^1} - p_{z^1}\|^2 \leq M^* \sqrt{n} \|\widehat{p}_{z^1} - p_{z^1}\|^2 = o_p(1). \end{aligned}$$

This implies that

$$\begin{aligned} & \sqrt{n}(G_{nz^1}(\pi) - G_{z^1}(\pi)) \\ & = D_{pz^1}(\pi) \sqrt{n}(\widehat{p}_{qz^1} - p_{qz^1}) + o_p(1) \\ & = D_{pz^1}(\pi) D_{az^1}(\sqrt{n}(\widehat{a}_{qz^1} - a_{qz^1}) + o_p(1)) \\ & = D_{pz^1}(\pi) D_{az^1}(D_{qz^1} \sqrt{n}(\widehat{q}_{qz^1} - q_{qz^1}) + o_p(1)) \\ & = \frac{1}{\sqrt{n}} \sum_{m=1}^n D_{pz^1}(\pi) D_{az^1} D_{qz^1} (\eta_{mz^1} - q_{z^1}) + o_p(1) \quad \text{and} \\ G_{nz^1}(\pi) & = \frac{1}{n} \sum_{m=1}^n [D_{pz^1}(\pi) D_{az^1} D_{qz^1} (\eta_{mz^1} - q_{z^1}) + G_{z^1}(\pi)] + o_p(n^{-1/2}), \end{aligned}$$

where definitions of  $D_{az^1}$  and  $D_{qz^1}$  can be found in Lemmas B.6 and B.7.

Without loss of generality, Lemmas B.6 and B.7 prove the result for  $\mathbf{z} = \mathbf{z}^1$ . The same result holds for  $\mathbf{z} = \mathbf{z}^2, \dots, \mathbf{z}^l$ , and such asymptotic linear representation of  $G_{nz}(\pi)$  is available for every observed state  $\mathbf{z}$ . Stacking the asymptotic linear representation for  $\mathbf{z} = \mathbf{z}^1, \dots, \mathbf{z}^l$ , we obtain the asymptotic linear representation for player 1's moment function when holding his exclusive observed state at  $z_1 = z_1^1$ . Note that on  $\mathbf{z}^l$ ,  $\mathbb{1}(\mathbf{z} = \mathbf{z}^l) = 1 - (\sum_{s=1}^{l-1} \mathbb{1}(\mathbf{z} = \mathbf{z}^s))$  and  $\Pr(\mathbf{z} = \mathbf{z}^l) = 1 - \sum_{s=1}^{l-1} \Pr(\mathbf{z} = \mathbf{z}^s)$ . We drop these two elements when defining  $\eta_{mz^l}$  and  $q_{z^l}$  and delete the corresponding last column of  $D_{qz^l}$ , so that elements in vector  $\eta_m - q$  are free of each other, where  $\eta_m$  and  $q$  are obtained by stacking  $\eta_{mz^s}$  and  $q_{z^s}$  together for  $s = 1, \dots, l$ . For  $m = 1, \dots, n$ , denote  $Q_m \equiv (d_{1m}, d_{2m}, d_{3m}, z_{1m}, z_{2m}, z_{3m})$ . The asymptotic linear representation is expressed as

$$G_n(\pi) = \frac{1}{n} \sum_{m=1}^n \phi(Q_m, \theta, \pi) + o_p(n^{-1/2}), \quad (\text{B.13})$$

where  $\phi(Q_m, \theta, \pi) = D_p(\pi) D_a D_q (\eta_m - q) + G(\pi)$ . The  $\theta$  in  $\phi(Q_m, \theta, \pi)$  includes elements in  $D_p(\pi)$ ,  $D_a$ ,  $D_q$ ,  $\Gamma$ , and  $q$ , which are obtained by stacking  $D_{pz}(\pi)$ ,  $D_{az}$ ,  $D_{qz}$ ,  $\Gamma_z$ , and  $q_z$  for  $\mathbf{z} = \mathbf{z}^1, \dots, \mathbf{z}^l$ .

The CCPs, contingency tables, and indicator functions are different across  $\mathbf{z}$ . This implies that the coefficient matrix in front of  $[[\eta_{mz^1} - q_{z^1}]^\top, \dots, [\eta_{mz^l} - q_{z^l}]^\top]^\top$  is block diagonal. Moreover, since  $D_{pz^s}(\pi) D_{az^s} D_{qz^s}$  is of rank 2 for  $s = 1, \dots, l$  and any  $\pi \in \Pi$ , each block has full row rank. Therefore, we obtain that  $D_p(\pi) D_a D_q$  has full row rank and

$\mathbb{E}(\phi(Q_m, \theta, \pi)\phi^\top(Q_m, \theta, \pi))$  is nonsingular. Thus, by the Lindeberg central limit theorem, the scaled and demeaned moment function converges in distribution to a normal distribution with a positive definite variance covariance matrix for any parameter sequence  $\xi_n \in \Xi_R(\xi)$  with any  $\xi \in \Xi_R$ . Assumption (i) in Lemma B.4 is verified. This result also implies that  $\Omega_0$  in Assumption 4.1(iv) is nonsingular. Under Assumption 4.1(iii) and (iv), Assumptions (ii) and (iii) in Lemma B.4 are satisfied. By Lemma B.4, the first part of the theorem follows.

Assumptions (i)–(iii) in Lemma B.5 are the same as Assumptions (i)–(iii) in Lemma B.1. The proof of Theorem 3.1 shows that Assumptions (i)–(iii) in Lemma B.1 are implied by Assumptions 2.1–2.6, 3.1, and 3.2. Thus, the second part of the theorem holds.  $\square$

LEMMA B.6. *Under Assumptions 2.3 and 4.1, it holds that for any  $\xi \in \Xi_R$  and the parameter sequence  $\{\xi_n\} \in \Xi_R(\xi)$ ,*

$$\sqrt{n}(\widehat{q}_{\mathbf{z}^1} - q_{\mathbf{z}^1}) = O_p(1) \quad \text{and} \quad (\text{B.14})$$

$$\sqrt{n}(\widehat{a}_{\mathbf{z}^1} - a_{\mathbf{z}^1}) = \sqrt{n}D_{q_{\mathbf{z}^1}}(\widehat{q}_{\mathbf{z}^1} - q_{\mathbf{z}^1}) + o_p(1), \quad \text{where} \quad (\text{B.15})$$

$$D_{q_{\mathbf{z}^1}} \equiv \begin{bmatrix} \frac{1}{q_9} & 0 & \dots & 0 & -\frac{q_1}{q_9^2} \\ 0 & \frac{1}{q_9} & \dots & 0 & -\frac{q_2}{q_9^2} \\ \vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots & \vdots \\ 0 & 0 & \dots & \frac{1}{q_9} & -\frac{q_8}{q_9^2} \end{bmatrix}_{8 \times 9}$$

in which  $\widehat{q}_{\mathbf{z}^1}$ ,  $q_{\mathbf{z}^1}$ ,  $\widehat{a}_{\mathbf{z}^1}$ , and  $a_{\mathbf{z}^1}$  are defined in (B.8)–(B.11).

PROOF OF LEMMA B.6. Since each element in  $\eta_{m\mathbf{z}^1}$  (defined in (B.12)) is less than or equal to 1, the Lindeberg condition is satisfied. Under Assumption 2.3, by Lindeberg central limit theorem, (B.14) holds. To obtain (B.15), apply the Taylor expansion of  $\sqrt{n}(\widehat{a}_{\mathbf{z}^1} - a_{\mathbf{z}^1})$  around  $q$ :

$$\sqrt{n}(\widehat{a}_{\mathbf{z}^1} - a_{\mathbf{z}^1}) = \sqrt{n}D_{q_{\mathbf{z}^1}}(\widehat{q}_{\mathbf{z}^1} - q_{\mathbf{z}^1}) + \sqrt{n} \sum_j \sum_k \frac{H_{q^*-j,k}}{2} (\widehat{q}_j - q_j)(\widehat{q}_k - q_k),$$

where  $D_{q_{\mathbf{z}^1}}$  is defined in the lemma, and  $H_{q^*-j,k}$  is the Hessian vector that stores the second-order derivatives with respect to  $q_j$  and  $q_k$  evaluated at  $q_{\mathbf{z}^1}^*$ , which is a point lying between  $q_{\mathbf{z}^1}$  and  $\widehat{q}_{\mathbf{z}^1}$ . Each element in  $H_{q^*-j,k}$  is either  $-\frac{1}{q_9^2}$ ,  $\frac{2q_j^*}{q_9^3}$ , or 0. Note that

$$\left\| \sqrt{n} \sum_j \sum_k \frac{H_{q^*-j,k}}{2} (\widehat{q}_j - q_j)(\widehat{q}_k - q_k) \right\| \leq \sqrt{n} \sum_j \sum_k \left\| \frac{H_{q^*-j,k}}{2} \right\| \|\widehat{q}_{\mathbf{z}^1} - q_{\mathbf{z}^1}\|^2.$$

For any  $\epsilon > 0$ , there exists  $N_{\epsilon,q} > 0$  such that  $\Pr(\|\widehat{q}_{\mathbf{z}^1} - q_{\mathbf{z}^1}\| < \frac{\delta_1}{2}) \geq 1 - \epsilon$  for  $n \geq N_{\epsilon,q}$  by triangular array Weak Law of Large Numbers (WLLN); and since  $q_9 = \Pr(\mathbf{z} = \mathbf{z}^1) \geq \delta_1 > 0$ ,

we obtain that  $\Pr(q_9^* \geq \frac{\delta_1}{2}) \geq 1 - \epsilon$  for  $n \geq N_{\epsilon, q}$ . For  $q_9^* \geq \frac{\delta_1}{2}$ , there exists  $M_1$  such that  $\sum_j \sum_k \left\| \frac{H_{q^*-j, k}}{2} \right\| \leq M_1 < \infty$ . Therefore, by (B.14) and triangular array WLLN, we have

$$\sqrt{n} \sum_j \sum_k \left\| \frac{H_{q^*-j, k}}{2} \right\| \|\widehat{q}_{z^1} - q_{z^1}\|^2 \leq M_1 \sqrt{n} \|\widehat{q}_{z^1} - q_{z^1}\|^2$$

holds with probability at least  $1 - \epsilon$  for  $n$  sufficiently large, where  $\epsilon > 0$  is arbitrary. Because  $\|\widehat{q}_{z^1} - q_{z^1}\| = O_p(n^{-1/2})$ , (B.15) holds.  $\square$

LEMMA B.7. *Under Assumption 2.1–2.5 and 4.1, it holds that*

$$\sqrt{n}(\widehat{p}_{z^1} - p_{z^1}) = \sqrt{n}D_{az^1}(\widehat{a}_{z^1} - a_{z^1}) + o_p(1) \quad (\text{B.16})$$

for any  $\xi \in \Xi_R$  and the parameter sequence  $\{\xi_n\} \in \Xi_R(\xi)$ , where  $D_{az^1} \equiv \frac{\partial p_{z^1}}{\partial a_{z^1}}$ , and  $\widehat{p}_{z^1}$  and  $p_{z^1}$  are defined in equation (B.7).

PROOF OF LEMMA B.7. Second-order Taylor expansion of  $\widehat{p}_{z^1}$  at  $a$  provides that

$$\sqrt{n}(\widehat{p}_{z^1} - p_{z^1}) = \sqrt{n}D_{az^1}(\widehat{a}_{z^1} - a_{z^1}) + \sqrt{n} \sum_j \sum_k \frac{H_{a^*-j, k}}{2} (\widehat{a}_j - a_j)(\widehat{a}_k - a_k),$$

where  $H_{a^*-j, k}$  is the Hessian vector that stores second-order derivatives with respect to  $a_j$  and  $a_k$  evaluated at  $a_{z^1}^*$ , which is a point between  $a_{z^1}$  and  $\widehat{a}_{z^1}$ . Under Assumption 2.5, the eigenvalues in the eigendecomposition are simple, and consequently there exists a neighborhood around the true value of  $a$  such that in this neighborhood the eigenvector function of  $A_{1z^1}^{12} (A_{1z^1}^{12})^{-1}$  (a matrix whose elements are continuous functions of  $a$ ) is analytic. CCPs for player 1 are delivered by the eigenvector function, and CCPs for other players are a continuously differentiable transformation of player 1's CCPs. Because  $\widehat{a}_{z^1} \xrightarrow{P} a_{z^1}$ , for large enough  $n$ ,  $H_{a^*-j, k}$  is bounded with probability close to 1. By a similar reasoning as in the previous lemma, the claim in the lemma holds.  $\square$

PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4.1. It suffices to show that  $W_n^b(c) \xrightarrow{P} W^b(c)$ , where  $W^b(c)$  is positive definite for any  $c \in \mathcal{C}_n$  and  $W^b(c_0) = \Omega_0^{-1}$ . Under Assumption 4.1,  $\Gamma_{c_0}$  is of full column rank and  $\text{rank}(\Gamma_{c_0}\Psi) = l_\pi - l_R$ . For  $n$  sufficiently large, we have  $\text{rank}(\Gamma_{n, c_0}\Psi) = l_\pi - l_R$  and  $\arg \min_{\pi_f} \|G_{n, c_0}(\Psi\pi_f + \mu)\|^2$  is unique. Therefore,  $W_n^b(c_0) = (\Sigma_n^b(c_0, \widehat{\pi}_f(c_0)))^{-1}$  for large enough  $n$ .

Latent states are matched across bootstrap draws with probability approaching one based on  $p_i(\mathbf{z}, k)$  and  $p_i(\mathbf{z}, k')$ . Under Assumptions 2.1–2.6, 3.1, and 4.1(i) and (ii) the moment functions for the Simple Game admits an asymptotic linear representation by the proof of Theorem 4.1. For the vector of functions  $\phi$  defined in (B.13), let  $\phi_{c_0}$  denotes its elements selected by  $c_0$ . Thus, it holds that

$$G_{n, c_0}^{(b)}(\Psi\widehat{\pi}_f(c_0) + \mu) = \frac{1}{n} \sum_{m=1}^n \phi_{c_0}(Q_m^{(b)}, \theta, \Psi\widehat{\pi}_f(c_0) + \mu) + o_p(1).$$



Since  $\widehat{\pi}_f(c_0) \xrightarrow{p} \pi_f^*(c_0)$  and  $\pi_0 = \Psi \pi_f^*(c_0) + \mu$  under the null hypothesis, where  $\pi_f^*(c_0) = \arg \min_{\pi \in \Pi} \|G_{c_0}(\Psi \pi_f + \mu)\|^2$ , we have  $\Psi \widehat{\pi}_f(c_0) + \mu \xrightarrow{p} \pi_0$ . Under Assumptions 2.1–2.6, 3.1, and 4.1(i) and (ii), it holds that

$$\sqrt{n}(G_{n,c_0}(\Psi \pi_f^*(c_0) + \mu) - G_{c_0}(\Psi \pi_f^*(c_0) + \mu)) \xrightarrow{d} N(0, \Omega_0)$$

and

$$\begin{aligned} & \sqrt{n}(G_{n,c_0}^{(b)}(\Psi \widehat{\pi}_f(c_0) + \mu) - G_{n,c_0}(\Psi \widehat{\pi}_f(c_0) + \mu)) \\ &= \sqrt{n} \left( \frac{1}{n} \sum_{m=1}^n \phi_{c_0}(Q_m^{(b)}, \theta, \Psi \widehat{\pi}_f(c_0) + \mu) - \frac{1}{n} \sum_{m=1}^n \phi_{c_0}(Q_m, \theta, \Psi \widehat{\pi}_f(c_0) + \mu) \right) + o_p^*(1) \\ &= \sqrt{n} \left( \frac{1}{n} \sum_{m=1}^n \phi_{c_0}(Q_m^{(b)}, \theta, \pi_0) - \frac{1}{n} \sum_{m=1}^n \phi_{c_0}(Q_m, \theta, \pi_0) \right) + o_p^*(1) \xrightarrow{d^*} N(0, \Omega_0), \end{aligned}$$

where the definitions of  $o_p^*(1)$  and  $\xrightarrow{d^*}$  can be found in Chapter 10 of Hansen (2021). The first equality holds because conditional on data, the difference between  $G_{n,c_0}^{(b)}(\Psi \widehat{\pi}_f(c_0) + \mu)$  and its linear representation is  $o_p(1)$ , and the difference between  $G_{n,c_0}(\Psi \widehat{\pi}_f(c_0) + \mu)$  and its linear representation is  $o_p(1)$ . Conditional on data, convergence in distribution holds by Theorem 10.8 in Hansen (2021) as  $\|\phi_{c_0}(Q_l, \theta, \pi_0)\|^2$  is uniformly square integrable by the proof of Theorem 4.1. By Theorem 10.13 in Hansen (2021),  $\Sigma_n^b(c_0, \widehat{\pi}_f(c_0)) = \Omega_0 + o_p(1)$  holds if  $y_n^{(b)}$  is uniformly square integrable, where

$$y_n^{(b)} \equiv \sqrt{n} \left( \frac{1}{n} \sum_{m=1}^n \phi_{c_0}(Q_m^{(b)}, \theta, \pi_0) - \frac{1}{n} \sum_{m=1}^n \phi_{c_0}(Q_m, \theta, \pi_0) \right).$$

Because the uniform square integrability of a vector is implied by each element of the vector being uniformly square integrable, let  $y_n^{(b)}(i)$  be its  $i$ th element. It holds that  $\mathbb{E}^* |y_n^{(b)}(i)|^4 = \frac{\widehat{\mu}_4(i) - 3\widehat{\sigma}^4(i)}{n} + 3\widehat{\sigma}^4(i)$ , where

$$\begin{aligned} \widehat{\mu}_4(i) &= \frac{1}{n} \sum_{m=1}^n \left| \phi_{c_0}^{(i)}(Q_m^{(b)}, \theta, \pi_0) - \frac{1}{n} \sum_{m=1}^n \phi_{c_0}^{(i)}(Q_m, \theta, \pi_0) \right|^4 \quad \text{and} \\ \widehat{\sigma}^2(i) &= \frac{1}{n} \sum_{m=1}^n \left| \phi_{c_0}^{(i)}(Q_m^{(b)}, \theta, \pi_0) - \frac{1}{n} \sum_{m=1}^n \phi_{c_0}^{(i)}(Q_m, \theta, \pi_0) \right|^2, \end{aligned}$$

with  $\phi_{c_0}^{(i)}(Q_m^{(b)}, \theta, \pi_0)$  and  $\phi_{c_0}^{(i)}(Q_m, \theta, \pi_0)$  being the  $i$ th element in  $\phi_{c_0}(Q_m^{(b)}, \theta, \pi_0)$  and  $\phi_{c_0}(Q_m, \theta, \pi_0)$ , respectively. Uniform square integrability of  $|\phi_{c_0}^{(i)}(Q_m, \theta, \pi_0)|^2$  implies that  $\frac{\widehat{\mu}_4(i)}{n} = o_p(1)$  and  $\widehat{\sigma}^2(i) = O_p(1)$ , which imply that  $\mathbb{E}^* |y_n^{(b)}(i)|^4 = O_p(1)$ . Therefore,  $y_n^{(b)}$  is uniformly square integrable and  $\Sigma_n^b(c_0, \widehat{\pi}_f(c_0)) = \Omega_0 + o_p(1)$  holds.  $\Omega_0$  is positive definite, because the asymptotic variance matrix of

$$\sqrt{n}(G_n(\Psi \pi_f^*(c_0) + \mu) - G(\Psi \pi_f^*(c_0) + \mu))$$

is positive definite and  $\Omega_0$  is its submatrix with the corresponding rows and columns selected by  $c_0$ .

It remains to prove that for  $c \neq c_0$ ,  $W_n^b(c)$  converges in probability to some positive definite matrix. If  $\text{rank}(\Gamma_{n,c}\Psi) < l_\pi - l_R$ , then  $W_n^b(c) = W_P$ , which is positive definite. If  $\text{rank}(\Gamma_c\Psi) = l_\pi - l_R$ , then  $\text{rank}(\Gamma_{n,c}\Psi) = l_\pi - l_R$  and  $\arg \min_{\pi_f} \|G_{n,c}(\Psi\pi_f + \mu)\|^2$  is unique for sufficiently large  $n$ . By a similar argument as the one for  $W_n^b(c_0)$ , it holds that  $W_n^b(c) = (\Sigma_n^b(c, \hat{\pi}_f(c)))^{-1} = \Sigma^{-1}(c) + o_p(1)$ , where  $\Sigma(c)$  is the asymptotic variance of  $\sqrt{n}(G_{n,c}(\Psi\pi_f^*(c) + \mu) - G_c(\Psi\pi_f^*(c) + \mu))$  with  $\pi_f^*(c) = \text{plim} \hat{\pi}_f(c)$ .  $\Sigma(c)$  is positive definite, because the asymptotic variance matrix of  $\sqrt{n}(G_n(\Psi\pi_f^*(c) + \mu) - G(\Psi\pi_f^*(c) + \mu))$  is positive definite and  $\Sigma(c)$  is its submatrix with the corresponding rows and columns selected by  $c$ . The proposition holds.  $\square$

#### B.4 Proofs of results in Section 5

PROOF OF LEMMA 5.1. To prove (i), note that under Assumptions 5.1–5.2, Step 1 identification is achieved,  $G(\pi)$  and  $\mathcal{C}^h$  are constructed for  $h \in \{1, \dots, |\Omega_{\mathbf{z}^1}|\}$ . In each  $\mathcal{C}^h$ , as  $\text{rank}([\bar{\pi}_c, \Gamma_c]) > \text{rank}(\Gamma_c)$  for any  $c$  that selects different latent states Assumption 5.3(ii),  $\mathcal{C}^h$  only contains select vectors that select the same latent state. Furthermore,  $c_0^h$  is defined as the vector in  $\mathcal{C}^h$  that selects the most moments, which happens only when all equilibria corresponding to a latent state is selected. Thus,  $c_0^h$  is unique.  $\Gamma_{c_0^h}$  has full column rank implies that the system selected by  $c_0^h$  uniquely determines  $\pi_0^h$ . To prove (ii), it remains to identify  $|\mathcal{K}|$  and the corresponding  $|\mathcal{K}|$  distinct payoff vectors. This could be done by a pairwise comparison of the payoff vectors. Specifically, if the payoff vectors  $\|\pi_0^{h_1} - \pi_0^{h_2}\| = 0$  for  $h_1 \neq h_2$ , then they correspond to the same latent state (or the same group). The total number of groups gives  $|\mathcal{K}|$ ; the distinct payoff vectors are the  $|\mathcal{K}|$  true payoff vectors denoted by  $t\pi_0^k$  for  $k = 1, \dots, |\mathcal{K}|$ .  $\square$

#### B.5 Proofs of results in Appendix A

LEMMA B.8. *Let the result of Lemma 5.1 and the following assumptions hold for the General Game. (i) For any  $\pi \in \Pi$ ,  $G_n(\pi) = G(\pi) + O_p(n^{-1/2})$ . (ii) For any  $c \in \mathcal{C}_n$ ,  $W_n(c) = W(c) + o_p(1)$  with  $W(c)$  being positive definite. (iii) For any  $c \in \mathcal{C}_n$ ,  $\min_{\pi \in \Pi} \|G_{n,c}(\pi)\|_{W_n(c)}^2 \xrightarrow{p} \min_{\pi \in \Pi} \|G_c(\pi)\|_{W(c)}^2$ . (iv)  $\rho_1(\cdot) > 0$  is a known strictly increasing function and  $\kappa_{1,n} \rightarrow \infty$  with  $\kappa_{1,n} = o(n)$ . Then it holds that for  $h = 1, \dots, |\Omega_{\mathbf{z}^1}|$ ,  $\hat{c}^h = c_0^h$  with probability approaching one and  $\hat{\pi}^h \xrightarrow{p} \pi_0^h$  for any  $l_1 \in \{l_\pi, l_\pi + 1, \dots, l\}$ ,  $\alpha_1 \in (0, 1]$ ,  $\lambda \in (-1, 0)$ , and  $\Delta \in \{1, \dots, l - l_1\}$ .*

PROOF OF LEMMA B.8. We prove the result for  $(\hat{c}^1, \hat{\pi}^1)$ . The superscript 1 in  $\mathcal{C}^1, \mathcal{C}^{\mathcal{J}^1}$ ,  $(c_0^1, \pi_0^1)$ ,  $\mathcal{C}_n^1$ , and  $(\hat{c}^1, \hat{\pi}^1)$  are omitted. Other notation that appeared in the proof are the same as the ones used in Section 5.2.1 and Appendix A.2. For  $s = 1, \dots, S$ , let  $sc_0^s \in \mathcal{S}^{\mathcal{C}^s}$  denote the subselection vector whose first  $J \sum_{t=1}^l |\Omega_{\mathbf{z}^t}|$  elements are the same as those of  $c_0$ . First, we show that  $\Pr(sc_0^s \in \mathcal{S}^{\mathcal{C}_n^s}) \rightarrow 1$  for  $s = 1, \dots, S$ . This implies that  $\Pr(c_0 \in \mathcal{C}_n) \rightarrow 1$ , because  $c_0 \in \mathcal{C}_n$  occurs if and only if  $sc_0^S \in \mathcal{S}^{\mathcal{C}_n^S}$  occurs.

Lemma 5.1 implies that  $G_{c_0}(\pi_0) = \mathbf{0}$ . Combined with Assumption (i) in the lemma, we obtain that  $\|G_{n,c_0}(\pi_0)\|^2 = O_p(n^{-1})$  and  $\|G_{n,sc_0^1}(\pi_0)\|^2 = O_p(n^{-1})$ . Therefore, it holds that

$$J_n(sc_0^1) = \min_{\pi \in \Pi} \|G_{n,sc_0^1}(\pi)\|^2 \leq \|G_{n,sc_0^1}(\pi_0)\|^2 = O_p(n^{-1}).$$

For any  $sc^1 \in \mathcal{S}\mathcal{C}^1$ , if  $J_n(sc^1) \leq n^\lambda$ , then  $sc^1 \in \mathcal{S}\mathcal{C}_n^1$  occurs. Therefore, we have that for any  $\lambda > -1$ ,

$$1 \geq \Pr(sc_0^1 \in \mathcal{S}\mathcal{C}_n^1) \geq \Pr(J_n(sc_0^1) \leq n^\lambda) \rightarrow 1,$$

which implies that  $\Pr(sc_0^1 \in \mathcal{S}\mathcal{C}_n^1) \rightarrow 1$ . The proof for  $\Pr(sc_0^s \in \mathcal{S}\mathcal{C}_n^s) \rightarrow 1$  for  $s = 2, \dots, S$  follows the same argument as the one in the proof of Lemma B.1. Hence, we obtain that  $\Pr(c_0 \in \mathcal{C}_n) \rightarrow 1$ .

Second, we show that if  $c_0 \in \mathcal{C}_n$ , then  $\Pr(\hat{c} = c_0) \rightarrow 1$ . For any  $c \in \mathcal{C}_n$  and  $c \notin \mathcal{C}\mathcal{S}$ , Assumption (iii) in the lemma implies that

$$\min_{\pi \in \Pi} \|G_{n,c}(\pi)\|_{W_n(c)}^2 \xrightarrow{P} \min_{\pi \in \Pi} \|G_c(\pi)\|_{W(c)}^2 > 0,$$

where the inequality follows from Lemma 5.1 and Assumption (ii). For any  $c \in \mathcal{C}$ , define

$$J_n^\dagger(c) \equiv \min_{\pi \in \Pi} \|G_{n,c}(\pi)\|_{W_n(c)}^2 - \rho_1(\|c\|_0)\kappa_{1,n}/n.$$

By Assumption (iv),  $\kappa_{1,n} = o(n)$ . Thus, for any  $c \notin \mathcal{C}\mathcal{S}$ ,

$$J_n^\dagger(c) = \min_{\pi \in \Pi} \|G_{n,c}(\pi)\|_{W_n(c)}^2 - \rho_1(\|c\|_0)\kappa_{1,n}/n > 0. \quad (\text{B.17})$$

On the other hand, we have that  $G_{c_0}(\pi_0) = \mathbf{0}$  by Lemma 5.1. Then by Assumption (i), it holds that  $G_{n,c_0}(\pi_0) = o_p(1)$ . Therefore, we obtain that

$$\min_{\pi \in \Pi} \|G_{n,c_0}(\pi)\|_{W_n(c_0)}^2 \leq \|G_{n,c_0}(\pi_0)\|_{W_n(c_0)}^2 = O_p(n^{-1}).$$

Together with Assumption (iv), it holds that

$$J_n^\dagger(c_0) = \min_{\pi \in \Pi} \|G_{n,c_0}(\pi)\|_{W_n(c_0)}^2 - \rho_1(\|c_0\|_0)\kappa_{1,n}/n = o_p(1). \quad (\text{B.18})$$

(B.17) and (B.18) imply that for any  $c \notin \mathcal{C}\mathcal{S}$ ,  $\Pr(J_n^\dagger(c_0) < J_n^\dagger(c)) \rightarrow 1$ .

At the same time, for any  $c \in \mathcal{C}\mathcal{S}$ , we have  $\min_{\pi \in \Pi} \|G_{n,c}(\pi)\|_{W_n(c)}^2 = O_p(n^{-1})$ . Assumption (iv) implies that

$$\min_{\pi \in \Pi} n \|G_{n,c}(\pi)\|_{W_n(c)}^2 / \kappa_{1,n} = o_p(1), \quad (\text{B.19})$$

for any  $c \in \mathcal{C}\mathcal{S}$ . For any  $c \in \mathcal{C}\mathcal{S}$  and  $c \neq c_0$ , Lemma 5.1 implies that  $\|c\|_0 < \|c_0\|_0$ . Then, by (B.19), we have that

$$n[J_n^\dagger(c_0) - J_n^\dagger(c)] = [\rho_1(\|c\|_0) - \rho_1(\|c_0\|_0)]\kappa_{1,n} + o_p(\kappa_{1,n}) \rightarrow -\infty.$$

Therefore, for any  $c \in \mathcal{C}\mathcal{J}$  and  $c \neq c_0$ ,  $\Pr(J_n^\dagger(c_0) < J_n^\dagger(c)) \rightarrow 1$ . Combined with the previous result, we have that for any  $c \neq c_0$ ,  $\Pr(J_n^\dagger(c_0) < J_n^\dagger(c)) \rightarrow 1$ . Thus, if  $c_0 \in \mathcal{C}_n$ , then  $\Pr(\widehat{c} = c_0) \rightarrow 1$ .

Hence, we have shown that  $\Pr(c_0 \in \mathcal{C}_n) \rightarrow 1$  and  $\Pr(\widehat{c} = c_0) \rightarrow 1$  if  $c_0 \in \mathcal{C}_n$ . We can conclude that  $\Pr(\widehat{c} = c_0) \rightarrow 1$ . The proof for  $\widehat{\pi} \xrightarrow{P} \pi_0$  follows the same proof for Lemma B.1.  $\square$

**PROOF OF THEOREM A.1.** The proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 3.1 with Lemma B.1 replaced by Lemma B.8. Assumption (iv) in Lemma B.8 is imposed by Assumption A.3.  $\square$

**PROOF OF THEOREM A.2.** We have that the numbers of mixing components are in an ascending order for  $\mathbf{z}^1, \dots, \mathbf{z}^l$ . Let  $l_e$  denote the number of observed states where multiple equilibria exist. We have that there is no multiple equilibria on  $\mathbf{z}^1, \dots, \mathbf{z}^{l-l_e}$ ; and there are multiple equilibria on  $\mathbf{z}^{l-l_e+1}, \dots, \mathbf{z}^l$ . Let  $s^\ddagger$  be the smallest value such that  $l_1 + s^\ddagger \Delta \leq l - l_e$ . Because  $l_e$  is not a function of  $l$  by Assumption A.4, the numbers of elementary operations from Step  $(s^\ddagger + 1)$  to Step  $S$  is not a function of  $l$  either. Therefore, we only need to show that the time complexity of Step 1 to Step  $s^\ddagger$  is linear in  $l$  with probability approaching one as  $n \rightarrow \infty$  for all payoffs except for a set of Lebesgue measure zero.

Because no multiple equilibria exists on  $\mathbf{z}^1, \dots, \mathbf{z}^{l-l_e}$ , all selection vector  $c \in \mathcal{C}\mathcal{J}$  share the same first  $(l - l_e)|\Omega_{\mathbf{z}^1}|$  components. As a result, from Step 1 to Step  $s^\ddagger$ , there is only one subselection vector  $sc^s$  in each step that shares the same first  $[l_1 + (s - 1)\Delta]|\Omega_{\mathbf{z}^1}|$  components as selection vectors in  $\mathcal{C}\mathcal{J}$ . Then, from Step 1 to Step  $s^\ddagger$ , the MMS procedure works almost the same the MMS procedure for the Simple Game. The only difference is that in step  $s = 1, \dots, s^\ddagger$ , the input set  $\mathcal{S}\mathcal{C}^s$  has cardinality  $2^{|\Omega_{\mathbf{z}^1}|-1}(2^{|\Omega_{\mathbf{z}^1}|} - 1)^{l_s-1} \prod_{i=1}^{s-1} \alpha_i^*$ , where  $\alpha_s^* \equiv |\mathcal{S}\mathcal{C}_n^s|/|\mathcal{S}\mathcal{C}^s|$ . Since we set  $\alpha = (2^{|\Omega_{\mathbf{z}^1}|} - 1)^{-\Delta}$ , following the same proof as Lemma B.2, we have that the time complexity of the MMS procedure is linear in  $l$  for the first  $s^\ddagger$  steps, assuming that the condition  $\alpha_s^* = \alpha$  for all  $s = s^\ddagger, \dots, s^\ddagger$  holds for some  $s^\ddagger$  independent of  $l$ . Applying the same argument in the proofs of Lemma B.3 and of Theorem 3.2, it can be shown that the required condition holds for with probability approaching one as  $n \rightarrow \infty$  for all payoffs except for a set of Lebesgue measure zero. The result of the space complexity of the MMS procedure follows from the exact same argument.  $\square$

**LEMMA B.9.** *Let  $l_e$  denote the number of observed states with multiple equilibria and  $|\overline{\Omega}| \equiv \max(|\Omega_{\mathbf{z}^1}|, \dots, |\Omega_{\mathbf{z}^l}|)$ . Assume that  $l_e$  grows with  $l$  at a rate slower than  $\log_{2^{|\overline{\Omega}|}}[h_e(l)]$  for some polynomial function  $h_e(\cdot)$ . Then with probability approaching one as  $n \rightarrow \infty$ , for all payoffs except for a set of Lebesgue measure zero, the time complexity of the MMS procedure for the General Game is at most a polynomial function of  $l$ .*

**PROOF OF LEMMA B.9.** The same applies to the proof of Theorem A.2, since the numbers of mixing components are in an ascending order for  $\mathbf{z}^1, \dots, \mathbf{z}^l$ ; there is no multiple equilibria on  $\mathbf{z}^1, \dots, \mathbf{z}^{l-l_e}$ , and there are multiple equilibria on  $\mathbf{z}^{l-l_e+1}, \dots, \mathbf{z}^l$ . Following

the proof of Theorem A.2, the time complexity of the MMS procedure when applying to  $\mathbf{z}^1, \dots, \mathbf{z}^{l-l_e}$  is upper bounded by a linear function of  $l - l_e$ . Denote the function as  $h(l - l_e)$ . The time complexity of the MMS procedure when applying to  $\mathbf{z}^{l-l_e+1}, \dots, \mathbf{z}^l$  is less than the number of possible combinations of selecting mixing components on  $\mathbf{z}^{l-l_e+1}, \dots, \mathbf{z}^l$ :  $\prod_{s=1}^{l_e} (2^{|\Omega_{\mathbf{z}^{l-l_e+s}}|} - 1)$ . The total time complexity is therefore upper bounded by

$$h(l - l_e) \times \prod_{s=1}^{l_e} (2^{|\Omega_{\mathbf{z}^{l-l_e+s}}|} - 1) \leq h(l) 2^{|\bar{\Omega}| l_e} \leq h(l) h_e(l),$$

where the first equality holds because  $h(\cdot)$  is an increasing function and by the definition of  $|\bar{\Omega}|$ , and the second inequality holds by the requirement on  $l_e$  stated in the lemma. Because  $h(l) h_e(l)$  is a polynomial function of  $l$ , the claimed lemma holds.  $\square$

PROOF OF THEOREM A.3. Define  $JJ_n(K, \mathbf{S}_K)$  as

$$JJ_n(K, \mathbf{S}_K) = \sum_{j=1}^K \sum_{\hat{\pi}^s \in S_{K,j}} \|\hat{\pi}^s - \mu_{K,j}\|^2 + \rho_2(K) \kappa_{2,n}/n.$$

Then  $(\widehat{K}, \widehat{\mathbf{S}}_{\widehat{K}}) = \arg \min_{K \leq |\Omega_{\mathbf{z}^1}|, \mathbf{S}_K \in \mathfrak{S}_K} JJ_n(K, \mathbf{S}_K)$ . Denote  $\mathbf{S}_{|\mathcal{X}|}^*$  as the correct partition. First, we show that  $\Pr(\widehat{\mathbf{S}}_{|\mathcal{X}|} = \mathbf{S}_{|\mathcal{X}|}^*) \rightarrow 1$ , where

$$\widehat{\mathbf{S}}_{|\mathcal{X}|} = \arg \min_{\mathbf{S}_{|\mathcal{X}|} \in \mathfrak{S}_{|\mathcal{X}|}} JJ_n(|\mathcal{X}|, \mathbf{S}_{|\mathcal{X}|}).$$

Then we prove that  $\Pr(\widehat{K} = |\mathcal{X}|) \rightarrow 1$ . At last, we show that  $\widehat{t}\pi^k$  with  $k = 1, \dots, \widehat{K}$  are consistent estimators.

Given the cardinality of partition  $|\mathcal{X}|$ , the term  $\rho_2(|\mathcal{X}|) \kappa_{2,n}/n$  is the same for all possible partitions and converges to zero by Assumption A.5. Theorem A.1 shows that for  $h = 1, \dots, |\Omega_{\mathbf{z}^1}|$ , we have  $\widehat{\pi}^h \xrightarrow{P} \pi_0^h$ . As a result, given the correct partition  $\mathbf{S}_{|\mathcal{X}|}^*$ , all  $\widehat{\pi}^h$  within the same set have the same probability limit. Therefore,  $JJ_n(|\mathcal{X}|, \mathbf{S}_{|\mathcal{X}|}^*) \xrightarrow{P} 0$ . On the other hand, if a partition is incorrect, then  $\|\widehat{\pi}^s - \mu_{|\mathcal{X}|,j}\|^2$  does not converge in probability to zero for at least one  $j$ . Thus, we conclude that  $\Pr(\widehat{\mathbf{S}}_{|\mathcal{X}|} = \mathbf{S}_{|\mathcal{X}|}^*) \rightarrow 1$ .

Based on the above discussion and the properties of  $\rho_2(\cdot)$  and  $\kappa_{2,n}$  by Assumption A.5, we have that given  $\widehat{\mathbf{S}}_{|\mathcal{X}|}$ ,  $JJ_n(|\mathcal{X}|, \widehat{\mathbf{S}}_{|\mathcal{X}|}) \xrightarrow{P} 0$ . For any  $K$ , define  $\widehat{\mathbf{S}}_K$  as  $\arg \min_{\mathbf{S}_K \in \mathfrak{S}_K} JJ_n(K, \mathbf{S}_K)$ . By the definition of  $t\pi_0^k$  for  $k = 1, \dots, |\mathcal{X}|$ ,  $t\pi_0^{k_1} \neq t\pi_0^{k_2}$  for  $k_1 \neq k_2$ . In consequence, if  $K < |\mathcal{X}|$ , then there must exist some  $j$  such that  $\widehat{\pi}^s \in \widehat{S}_{K,j}$  have different probability limits. Because  $\rho_2(K) \kappa_{2,n}/n \rightarrow 0$  for any  $K$ , we have that  $JJ_n(K, \widehat{\mathbf{S}}_K) \xrightarrow{P} \delta > 0$  for any  $K < |\mathcal{X}|$ . Thus,  $\Pr(\widehat{K} < |\mathcal{X}|) \rightarrow 0$ . On the other hand, if  $K > |\mathcal{X}|$ ,

$$n[JJ_n(|\mathcal{X}|, \widehat{\mathbf{S}}_{|\mathcal{X}|}) - JJ_n(K, \widehat{\mathbf{S}}_K)] = [\rho_2(|\mathcal{X}|) - \rho_2(K)] \kappa_{2,n} + o_p(\kappa_{2,n}) \rightarrow -\infty,$$

where the first equality holds because  $\widehat{\pi}^h - \pi_0^h = O_p(n^{-1/2})$ . Therefore,  $\Pr(\widehat{K} > |\mathcal{X}|) \rightarrow 0$ . Hence, we have  $\Pr(\widehat{K} = |\mathcal{X}|) \rightarrow 1$ . Together with the previous result that  $\Pr(\widehat{\mathbf{S}}_{|\mathcal{X}|} =$

$\mathbf{S}_{|\mathcal{K}|}^* \rightarrow 1$ , we conclude that

$$\Pr(\widehat{\mathbf{S}}_{\widehat{K}} = \mathbf{S}_{|\mathcal{K}|}^*) = \Pr(\widehat{K} = |\mathcal{K}|, \widehat{\mathbf{S}}_{\widehat{K}} = \mathbf{S}_{|\mathcal{K}|}^*) \rightarrow 1.$$

By definition,  $\widehat{t}\pi^j = \frac{1}{|\widehat{\mathcal{S}}_{\widehat{K},j}|} \sum_{\widehat{\pi}^h \in \widehat{\mathcal{S}}_{\widehat{K},j}} \widehat{\pi}^h$  for  $j = 1, \dots, \widehat{K}$ . Since  $\widehat{\pi}^h \xrightarrow{P} \pi_0^h$  for  $h = 1, \dots, |\Omega_{\mathbf{z}^1}|$  by Theorem A.1, there exist one permutation of  $t\pi_0^k$  for  $k = 1, \dots, |\mathcal{K}|$ , denoted as  $t\pi_0^{(k)}$ , such that

$$\Pr\left(\sum_{k=1}^{|\mathcal{K}|} \|\widehat{t}\pi^k - t\pi_0^{(k)}\| < \delta | \widehat{\mathbf{S}}_{\widehat{K}} = \mathbf{S}_{|\mathcal{K}|}^*\right) \rightarrow 1$$

for any  $\delta > 0$ . Because  $\Pr(\widehat{\mathbf{S}}_{\widehat{K}} = \mathbf{S}_{|\mathcal{K}|}^*) \rightarrow 1$ , it holds that

$$\begin{aligned} \Pr\left(\sum_{k=1}^{|\mathcal{K}|} \|\widehat{t}\pi^k - t\pi_0^{(k)}\| < \delta\right) &\geq \Pr\left(\sum_{k=1}^{|\mathcal{K}|} \|\widehat{t}\pi^k - t\pi_0^{(k)}\| < \delta, \widehat{\mathbf{S}}_{\widehat{K}} = \mathbf{S}_{|\mathcal{K}|}^*\right) \\ &= \Pr\left(\sum_{k=1}^{|\mathcal{K}|} \|\widehat{t}\pi^k - t\pi_0^{(k)}\| < \delta | \widehat{\mathbf{S}}_{\widehat{K}} = \mathbf{S}_{|\mathcal{K}|}^*\right) \Pr(\widehat{\mathbf{S}}_{\widehat{K}} = \mathbf{S}_{|\mathcal{K}|}^*) \\ &\rightarrow 1. \end{aligned}$$

Thus,  $\widehat{t}\pi^1, \dots, \widehat{t}\pi^{\widehat{K}}$  are consistent estimators for  $t\pi_0^k$  with  $k = 1, \dots, |\mathcal{K}|$ .  $\square$

**PROOF OF THEOREM A.4.** The proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 4.1. Assumption A.6(i) serves the same role as Assumption 4.1(i) for Theorem 4.1. We omit the superscript  $s$  when there is no confusion. Without loss of generality, suppose  $\mathcal{C}\mathcal{S}$  has  $(q+1)$  elements:  $\mathcal{C}\mathcal{S} = \{c_0, c_1, \dots, c_q\}$ . Following similar arguments in the proof of Lemma B.4, we have that any  $\xi \in \Xi_R$  and the parameter sequence  $\{\xi_n\} \in \Xi_R(\xi)$ ,  $\|\sqrt{n}G_{n,c}(\pi_0)\|_{W_n(c)}^2 \xrightarrow{d} \chi_{[\|c\|_0 - l_\pi + l_R]}^2$  for any  $c \in \mathcal{C}\mathcal{S}$ . As a result,

$$\min_{R\pi=r} \|\sqrt{n}G_{n,c}(\pi)\|_{W_n(c)}^2 \xrightarrow{d} F_c \stackrel{d}{\leq} \chi_{[\|c\|_0 - l_\pi + l_R]}^2,$$

where  $F_c$  is some tight limiting distribution and  $\stackrel{d}{\leq}$  denotes stochastic dominance. It holds that for any  $\xi \in \Xi_R$  and the parameter sequence  $\{\xi_n\} \in \Xi_R(\xi)$ ,

$$T_n \xrightarrow{d} T \stackrel{d}{\leq} \min\{\chi_{[\|c_0\|_0 - (l_\pi - l_R)]}^2, \dots, \chi_{[\|c_q\|_0 - (l_\pi - l_R)]}^2\} \stackrel{d}{\leq} \chi_{[Jl - (l_\pi - l_R)]}^2,$$

where the last inequality holds because  $\min_{c \in \mathcal{C}\mathcal{S}} \|c\|_0 = Jl$ . Thus, using  $\chi_{[Jl - (l_\pi - l_R)]}^2, 1-\alpha$  as the critical value achieves asymptotic size control.  $\square$

**LEMMA B.10.** Under Assumptions 5.3 and A.7, the unique solution to  $G_c(\pi) = \mathbf{0}$  for any  $c \in \mathcal{C}\mathcal{S}^s$  is the true payoff vector  $\pi_0^s$ .

**PROOF OF LEMMA B.10.** By Assumption 5.3(ii),  $G_c(\pi) = \mathbf{0}$  has no solution for any  $c \in \mathcal{C}^s$  that selects different latent states. As a result, any  $c \in \mathcal{C}^s$  must select the same latent state. The payoff vector corresponding to the selected latent state is the solution to the system of linear equations:  $G_c(\pi_0^s) = \mathbf{0}$  for any  $c \in \mathcal{C}^s$ . Because  $G_c(\pi) = \mathbf{0}$  for any  $c \in \mathcal{C}^s$  has a unique solution by Assumption A.7, the result in the lemma holds.  $\square$

**PROOF OF THEOREM A.5.** The asymptotic properties of  $G_{n,c}(\pi)$  for some given  $c$  and  $\pi$  are the same as that of  $G_{n,c}(\pi)$  in Theorem 4.1 given the assumptions in Theorem A.4. We omit the superscript  $s$  when there is no confusion.

Firstly, by Lemma 5.1 and Assumption A.2, for any  $c \notin \mathcal{C}^s$ ,  $\min_{\pi} \|\sqrt{n}G_{n,c}(\pi)\|_{W_n(c)}^2$  diverges to infinity. Second, by Lemma B.10,  $G_c(\pi) = \mathbf{0}$  has the unique solution  $\pi_0$  for any  $c \in \mathcal{C}^s$ . When  $\xi \notin \Xi_R$ , for all  $c \in \mathcal{C}^s$ ,  $\min_{R\pi=r} \|\sqrt{n}G_{n,c}(\pi)\|_{W_n(c)}^2$  diverges to infinity. Since  $\chi_{[Jl-l_{\pi}+l_R],1-\alpha}^2$  is finite, it holds that  $\lim_{n \rightarrow \infty} \Pr_{\xi}(T_n > \chi_{[Jl-l_{\pi}+l_R],1-\alpha}^2) = 1$ . We conclude the result in the theorem.  $\square$

## APPENDIX C: XIAO (2018)'S CCP ESTIMATOR AND IDENTIFICATION IN THE GENERAL GAME

In this section, we first present the method developed by Xiao (2018) for Step 1 identification and estimation for both the Simple Game and the General Game. Then we discuss the equivalence between Step 2 identification conditions in the General Game and Aguirregabiria and Mira (2019)'s necessary and sufficient condition.

### C.1 Identification of the CCPs in the Simple Game

Recall some notation from Section 2 of the paper. For  $i = 1, 2, 3$ ,  $p_i(\mathbf{z}, A) \equiv \Pr(d_i = 1 | \mathbf{z}, A)$ ,  $p_i(\mathbf{z}, B) \equiv \Pr(d_i = 1 | \mathbf{z}, B)$ ,  $p^A(\mathbf{z}) \equiv \Pr(k = A | \mathbf{z})$ , and  $p^B(\mathbf{z}) \equiv \Pr(k = B | \mathbf{z})$ . For  $k, k' \in \{A, B\}$  and  $k \neq k'$ , let

$$\mathbf{P}_{i\mathbf{z}} = \begin{bmatrix} p_i(\mathbf{z}, k) & p_i(\mathbf{z}, k') \\ 1 - p_i(\mathbf{z}, k) & 1 - p_i(\mathbf{z}, k') \end{bmatrix} \quad \text{for } i = 1, 2, 3.$$

Define the vector of mixing weights as  $W_{k|\mathbf{z}} = (p^k(\mathbf{z}), p^{k'}(\mathbf{z}))^\top$ . Its diagonal form is written as  $D_{k|\mathbf{z}} = \text{diag}(W_{k|\mathbf{z}}^\top)$ . Let the diagonal matrix containing player  $i$ 's CCPs of choosing action  $d_i = 0, 1$  on two latent states be

$$D_{1\mathbf{z}}^i \equiv \text{diag}(p_i(\mathbf{z}, k), p_i(\mathbf{z}, k')) \quad \text{and} \quad D_{0\mathbf{z}}^i \equiv \text{diag}(1 - p_i(\mathbf{z}, k), 1 - p_i(\mathbf{z}, k')).$$

Consider identifying CCPs for player 1 on observed state  $\mathbf{z}$ . Define the following population contingency tables:

$$A_{1\mathbf{z}}^{12} \equiv \begin{bmatrix} \Pr((d_1, d_2, d_3) = (1, 1, 1) | \mathbf{z}), & \Pr((d_1, d_2, d_3) = (1, 0, 1) | \mathbf{z}) \\ \Pr((d_1, d_2, d_3) = (0, 1, 1) | \mathbf{z}), & \Pr((d_1, d_2, d_3) = (0, 0, 1) | \mathbf{z}) \end{bmatrix},$$

$$A_{\mathbf{z}}^{12} \equiv \begin{bmatrix} \Pr((d_1, d_2) = (1, 1) | \mathbf{z}), & \Pr((d_1, d_2) = (1, 0) | \mathbf{z}) \\ \Pr((d_1, d_2) = (0, 1) | \mathbf{z}), & \Pr((d_1, d_2) = (0, 0) | \mathbf{z}) \end{bmatrix},$$



$$A_{\mathbf{z}}^{13} \equiv \begin{bmatrix} \Pr((d_1, d_3) = (1, 1)|\mathbf{z}), & \Pr((d_1, d_3) = (1, 0)|\mathbf{z}) \\ \Pr((d_1, d_3) = (0, 1)|\mathbf{z}), & \Pr((d_1, d_3) = (0, 0)|\mathbf{z}) \end{bmatrix},$$

and  $A_{\mathbf{z}}^1 \equiv [\Pr(d_1 = 1|\mathbf{z}), \Pr(d_1 = 0|\mathbf{z})]^\top$ . The matrices  $A_{1\mathbf{z}}^{12}$ ,  $A_{\mathbf{z}}^{12}$ ,  $A_{\mathbf{z}}^{13}$ , and  $A_{\mathbf{z}}^1$  are identified from data. By construction, the population contingency tables can be written as products of CCPs and mixing weights:

$$\begin{aligned} A_{1\mathbf{z}}^{12} &= \mathbf{P}_{1\mathbf{z}} D_{1\mathbf{z}}^3 D_{k|\mathbf{z}} \mathbf{P}_{2\mathbf{z}}^\top, & A_{\mathbf{z}}^{12} &= \mathbf{P}_{1\mathbf{z}} D_{k|\mathbf{z}} \mathbf{P}_{2\mathbf{z}}^\top, \\ A_{\mathbf{z}}^{13} &= \mathbf{P}_{1\mathbf{z}} D_{k|\mathbf{z}} \mathbf{P}_{3\mathbf{z}}^\top, & \text{and } A_{\mathbf{z}}^1 &= \mathbf{P}_{1\mathbf{z}} W_{k|\mathbf{z}}. \end{aligned}$$

The CCPs are identified using the eigendecomposition method. First, CCPs for player 1 are identified as the eigenvectors (of the left-hand side observable matrix) with column sum being 1:  $A_{1\mathbf{z}}^{12} (A_{\mathbf{z}}^{12})^{-1} = \mathbf{P}_{1\mathbf{z}} D_{1\mathbf{z}}^3 \mathbf{P}_{1\mathbf{z}}^{-1}$  and the vector of mixing weights is identified as  $W_{k|\mathbf{z}} = (\mathbf{P}_{1\mathbf{z}})^{-1} A_{\mathbf{z}}^1$ . Second, given the recovered  $\mathbf{P}_{1\mathbf{z}}$ ,  $W_{k|\mathbf{z}}$  (and  $D_{k|\mathbf{z}}$ ), CCPs for players 2 and 3 are identified as  $\mathbf{P}_{2\mathbf{z}} = (A_{\mathbf{z}}^{12})^\top (D_{k|\mathbf{z}}^\top \mathbf{P}_{1\mathbf{z}}^\top)^{-1}$  and  $\mathbf{P}_{3\mathbf{z}} = (A_{\mathbf{z}}^{13})^\top (D_{k|\mathbf{z}}^\top \mathbf{P}_{1\mathbf{z}}^\top)^{-1}$ .

Note that if we change the order of the two columns of the eigenvector matrix  $\mathbf{P}_{1\mathbf{z}}$  and eigenvalue matrix  $D_{1\mathbf{z}}^3$  at the same time, equation  $A_{1\mathbf{z}}^{12} (A_{\mathbf{z}}^{12})^{-1} = \mathbf{P}_{1\mathbf{z}} D_{1\mathbf{z}}^3 \mathbf{P}_{1\mathbf{z}}^{-1}$  still holds and equations  $W_{k|\mathbf{z}} = (\mathbf{P}_{1\mathbf{z}})^{-1} A_{\mathbf{z}}^1$ ,  $\mathbf{P}_{2\mathbf{z}} = (A_{\mathbf{z}}^{12})^\top (D_{k|\mathbf{z}}^\top \mathbf{P}_{1\mathbf{z}}^\top)^{-1}$ , and  $\mathbf{P}_{3\mathbf{z}} = (A_{\mathbf{z}}^{13})^\top (D_{k|\mathbf{z}}^\top \mathbf{P}_{1\mathbf{z}}^\top)^{-1}$  inherit the order of the unobserved states adopted in equation  $A_{1\mathbf{z}}^{12} (A_{\mathbf{z}}^{12})^{-1} = \mathbf{P}_{1\mathbf{z}} D_{1\mathbf{z}}^3 \mathbf{P}_{1\mathbf{z}}^{-1}$ . Thus, the CCPs for three players are identified up to a common label swapping.

## C.2 Identification of the CCPs in the General Game

The General Game could have more than three players and more than two mixing components. In such cases, the identification method developed in Xiao (2018) employs the eigendecomposition using group actions. Following Xiao (2018), we divide the  $N$  players into three groups, such that the third group has exactly one player for odd  $N$  and two players for even  $N$ , and each of the first two groups has  $\tilde{N}$  players. Thus,  $N = 2\tilde{N} + 1$  when  $N$  is odd, and  $N = 2\tilde{N} + 2$  when  $N$  is even. Player group  $i$  is denoted as  $g_i$  for  $i = 1, 2, 3$ . By definition,  $\bigcup_{i=1}^3 g_i = \{1, \dots, N\}$ . For each group, we create a group action variable, denoted by  $d_{g_1}$ ,  $d_{g_2}$ , and  $d_{g_3}$ . We have  $d_{g_1}, d_{g_2} \in \{0, \dots, (J+1)^{\tilde{N}} - 1\}$ , and  $d_{g_3} \in \{0, \dots, J\}$  if there is one player in group 3 and  $d_{g_3} \in \{0, \dots, (J+1)^2 - 1\}$  if there are two players in group 3.

Denote the matrix composed of CCPs for group action  $d_{g_i}$  for  $i = 1, 2$  on each latent state as

$$\mathbf{P}_{g_i\mathbf{z}} \equiv (\Pr(d_{g_i} = j|\mathbf{z}, k))_{j=0, k=1}^{(J+1)^{\tilde{N}}-1, |\mathcal{K}|}.$$

The assumption needed for identifying CCPs up to a label swapping is stated in the following.

**ASSUMPTION C.1.** (i)  $N \geq 3$ . (ii)  $(J+1)^{\tilde{N}} > |\Omega_{\mathbf{z}}|$  for any  $\mathbf{z}$ . (iii) For each  $\mathbf{z}$ , there exists a partition  $(d_{g_1}, d_{g_2}, d_{g_3})$  of joint actions  $(d_1, \dots, d_N)$  such that  $\mathbf{P}_{g_1\mathbf{z}}$  and  $\mathbf{P}_{g_2\mathbf{z}}$  both have full column rank.

Assumption C.1 guarantees the identification of  $|\Omega_{\mathbf{z}}|$  and the equilibrium CCPs (up to a label swapping). Define  $A_{d\mathbf{z}}^{g_1g_2}$  as the joint contingency table for player groups  $g_1$  and  $g_2$  fixing player group  $g_3$ 's action at  $d_{g_3} = d$ . Let  $A_{\mathbf{z}}^{g_i}$  and  $A_{\mathbf{z}}^{ig}$  be the joint contingency tables of some generic player group  $g$  and individual player  $i$ . For each  $\mathbf{z}$ , CCPs are identified following Xiao (2018). First, under (ii), Lemma 1 in Xiao (2018) applies to identify  $|\Omega_{\mathbf{z}}|$  as  $\text{rank}(A_{\mathbf{z}}^{g_1g_2})$  for each observed  $\mathbf{z}$ . Given  $|\Omega_{\mathbf{z}}|$ , by summing up rows and columns of  $A_{\mathbf{z}}^{g_1g_2}$  (thus collapsing the actions of player group 1 and player group 2), we can create  $A_{\mathbf{z}}^{\tilde{g}_1\tilde{g}_2}$  with  $\text{rank}(A_{\mathbf{z}}^{\tilde{g}_1\tilde{g}_2}) = |\Omega_{\mathbf{z}}|$ , where  $\tilde{g}_1$  and  $\tilde{g}_2$  denote player group 1 and player group 2 with collapsed actions. Let  $\mathbf{P}_{\tilde{g}_i}$  denote the matrix storing CCPs for player group  $g_i$  with collapsed actions (each column corresponds to a different  $\omega$ ). Second, we use eigendecomposition to identify  $\mathbf{P}_{\tilde{g}_1\mathbf{z}}$  as  $A_{d\mathbf{z}}^{\tilde{g}_1\tilde{g}_2}(A_{\mathbf{z}}^{\tilde{g}_1\tilde{g}_2})^{-1} = \mathbf{P}_{\tilde{g}_1\mathbf{z}}D_{d\mathbf{z}}^{g_3}(\mathbf{P}_{\tilde{g}_1\mathbf{z}})^{-1}$ , where  $D_{d\mathbf{z}}^{g_3}$  is the diagonal matrix storing the conditional choice probabilities of  $d_{g_3} = d$  for all  $\omega$  on the diagonal. The vector of mixing weights is identified as  $W_{\mathbf{z}} = (\mathbf{P}_{\tilde{g}_1\mathbf{z}})^{-1}A_{\mathbf{z}}^{\tilde{g}_1}$ . Define  $D_{\mathbf{z}} = \text{diag}(W_{\mathbf{z}}^{\top})$ , the equilibrium CCPs for player group 2 with collapsed actions are then identified as  $\mathbf{P}_{\tilde{g}_2\mathbf{z}} = (A_{\mathbf{z}}^{\tilde{g}_1\tilde{g}_2})^{\top}(D_{\mathbf{z}}^{\top}\mathbf{P}_{\tilde{g}_1\mathbf{z}}^{\top})^{-1}$ . For equilibrium CCPs of individual player  $i \in g_2 \cup g_3$ , we obtain  $\mathbf{P}_{i\mathbf{z}}^{\top} = (\mathbf{P}_{\tilde{g}_1\mathbf{z}}D_{\mathbf{z}})^{-1}A_{\mathbf{z}}^{\tilde{g}_1i}$ . For equilibrium CCPs of individual player  $i \in g_1$ , we have  $\mathbf{P}_{i\mathbf{z}}^{\top} = A_{\mathbf{z}}^{ig_2}(D_{\mathbf{z}}\mathbf{P}_{\tilde{g}_2\mathbf{z}}^{\top})^{-1}$ . In estimation, model implied restrictions can be incorporated to this procedure to improve accuracy.

### C.3 $\sqrt{n}$ -consistency and asymptotic normality of the CCP estimator

Both the root- $n$  consistency and the asymptotic normality require the eigenvalues in the eigendecomposition be simple. In the Simple Game, such a condition holds automatically under Assumption 2.5, which implies that all players have different CCPs of choosing each action in different latent states. In the General Game, an additional assumption is needed for the consistency and the asymptotic normality.

**ASSUMPTION C.2.** *There exists a known group action for player group  $g_3$  such that the corresponding equilibrium CCPs of choosing this group action is different across different values of  $\omega$ .*

Under Assumptions 5.1–5.3 and Assumption C.2, the argument in Xiao (2018) delivers root- $n$  consistency and asymptotic normality of the CCP estimator.

### C.4 Further discussions on Step 2 identification in the General Game

We mentioned that Assumption 5.3 is equivalent to the necessary and sufficient condition proposed in Proposition 3 of Aguirregabiria and Mira (2019) except that we consider identification for each pair of player and exclusive state separately. In particular, Assumption 5.3(i) holds if and only if for each  $h = 1, \dots, |\Omega_{\mathbf{z}_1}|$ , there exists some  $c^* \in \mathcal{C} \mathcal{S}^h$  such that  $\Gamma_{c^*}$  has full column rank (the condition in Proposition 3 of Aguirregabiria and Mira (2019)). This is due to the following reasoning. On the one hand, if there exists  $c^* \in \mathcal{C} \mathcal{S}^h$  such that  $\Gamma_{c^*}$  has full column rank, then  $\Gamma_{c_0^*}^h$  certainly has full column rank. This is because if  $c^*$  does not select the most number of rows, adding more rows does not

decreases the column rank of a matrix; while if  $c^*$  selects the most number of rows, then  $c_0^* = c_0^h$ . On the other hand, if  $\Gamma_{c_0^h}$  has full column rank, then there exists  $c^* = c_0^h \in \mathcal{C} \mathcal{I}$  such that  $\Gamma_{c^*}$  has full column rank.

#### APPENDIX D: ADDITIONAL DETAILS ON THE GAMES IN THE SIMULATIONS

In this section, we provide more details on the games used in the simulations.

##### D.1 Identification of games in the simulation

For the system of moment functions of Game 1, there are two parameters on each latent state, while the number of correct moments are 18, 27, 64, 100, and 288, respectively from Design 1 to Design 5. Assumption 2.6 for Step 2 identification is verified for the parameter values listed in Section D.2.

For Game 2, let the equilibrium CCP vector be

$$\mathbf{p}(\mathbf{z}, x, k) \equiv (p_1(\mathbf{z}, x, k), p_2(\mathbf{z}, x, k), p_3(\mathbf{z}, x, k))$$

for  $\mathbf{z} \in \mathcal{Z}$  and  $x \in \mathcal{X}$ , where for  $i = 1, 2, 3$ ,  $p_i(\mathbf{z}, x, k) \equiv \Pr(d_i = 1 | \mathbf{z}, x, k)$ . Step 1 identification of equilibrium CCPs and mixing weights makes use of the following system of equations: for  $(d_1, d_2, d_3) \in \{0, 1\} \times \{0, 1\} \times \{0, 1\}$ ,

$$p(d_1, d_2, d_3 | \mathbf{z}, x) = \sum_{k \in \{A, B\}} \left[ p^k(\mathbf{z}, x) \prod_{i=1}^3 (p_i(\mathbf{z}, x, k))^{d_i} (1 - p_i(\mathbf{z}, x, k))^{1-d_i} \right]$$

and can proceed in exactly the same way as Step 1 for the Simple Game.

Step 2 identification is similar to that of the Simple Game. Let  $l_z \equiv \prod_{i=1}^3 |\mathcal{Z}_i|$  and  $\{\mathbf{z}^1, \dots, \mathbf{z}^{l_z}\}$  with  $\mathbf{z}^t \equiv (z_1^t, z_2^t, z_3^t)$  be the  $l_z$  different values in  $\mathcal{Z}_1 \times \mathcal{Z}_2 \times \mathcal{Z}_3$ . Denote  $l_x \equiv |\mathcal{X}|$  and  $\mathcal{X} \equiv \{x^1, \dots, x^{l_x}\}$ . We can obtain the following system for player 1 via stacking two latent states on each  $(\mathbf{z}, x)$  for  $\mathbf{z} \in \{\mathbf{z}^1, \dots, \mathbf{z}^{l_z}\}$  and  $x \in \mathcal{X}$ :

$$G(\pi) = [\bar{\pi}_1^\top(x^1), \dots, \bar{\pi}_1^\top(x^{l_x})]^\top - [\Gamma_1^\top(x^1), \dots, \Gamma_1^\top(x^{l_x})]^\top \pi, \quad \text{where}$$

$$\bar{\pi}_1(x) \equiv [\bar{\pi}_1(1, \mathbf{z}^1, x, k_1), \bar{\pi}_1(1, \mathbf{z}^1, x, k'_1), \dots, \bar{\pi}_1(1, \mathbf{z}^{l_z}, x, k_{l_z}), \bar{\pi}_1(1, \mathbf{z}^{l_z}, x, k'_{l_z})]^\top \quad \text{and}$$

$$\Gamma_1(x) \equiv \left[ \begin{array}{c} \left[ x \quad z_1^1 (p_2(\mathbf{z}^1, k_1) + p_3(\mathbf{z}^1, k_1)) \right]^\top, \left[ x \quad z_1^1 (p_2(\mathbf{z}^1, k'_1) + p_3(\mathbf{z}^1, k'_1)) \right]^\top, \dots, \\ \left[ x \quad z_1^{l_z} (p_2(\mathbf{z}^{l_z}, k_{l_z}) + p_3(\mathbf{z}^{l_z}, k_{l_z})) \right]^\top, \left[ x \quad z_1^{l_z} (p_2(\mathbf{z}^{l_z}, k'_{l_z}) + p_3(\mathbf{z}^{l_z}, k'_{l_z})) \right]^\top \end{array} \right]^\top.$$

The dimensions for  $\bar{\pi}$  and  $\Gamma$  are  $2l_z l_x \times 1$  and  $2l_z l_x \times 2$ , respectively.

Given some selected latent state for  $(\mathbf{z}^1, x^1)$ , we could match this latent state across all exclusive and common observed states with the parameter spaces of the true selection vectors given by

$$\mathcal{C}^1 = \{[c_1, \dots, c_{l_z l_x}]^\top : c_1 = [1, 0] \text{ and } c_t \in \{[1, 0], [0, 1]\} \text{ for } t \in \{2, \dots, l_z l_x\}\} \quad \text{and}$$

$$\mathcal{C}^2 = \{[c_1, \dots, c_{l_z l_x}]^\top : c_1 = [0, 1] \text{ and } c_t \in \{[1, 0], [0, 1]\} \text{ for } t \in \{2, \dots, l_z l_x\}\}.$$

For  $c$  belonging to  $\mathcal{C}^1$  or  $\mathcal{C}^2$ , we have  $\|c\|_0 = l_z l_x$ . Given a parameter space of the true selection vector with the first selected latent state being  $k$ , the unique solution to the system  $G_{c_0}(\pi) = \mathbf{0}$  gives us  $(\beta_{1k}, \delta_{1k})^\top$ .

In simulation,  $l_z l_x = 24, 36, 54, 81, 162$ , respectively, for each design specified in Section D.2. The number of unknowns in the system is strictly less than the number of correct moments. The parameter values used in the simulation satisfy Assumption 2.6 for Step 2 identification.

For Games 3–4, let the equilibrium CCP vector be

$$\mathbf{p}(x, \omega) \equiv (p_1(x, \omega), p_2(x, \omega), p_3(x, \omega), p_4(x, \omega), p_5(x, \omega))$$

for  $x \in \mathcal{X}$ , where for  $i = 1, \dots, 5$ ,  $p_i(x, \omega) \equiv \Pr(d_i = 1 | x, \omega)$ . Step 1 identification of equilibrium CCPs and mixing weights makes use of the following system of equations: for  $(d_1, d_2, d_3, d_4, d_5) \in \{0, 1\} \times \{0, 1\} \times \{0, 1\} \times \{0, 1\} \times \{0, 1\}$ ,

$$p(d_1, d_2, d_3, d_4, d_5 | x) = \sum_{\omega \in \Omega_x} \left[ p(\omega | x) \prod_{i=1}^5 (p_i(x, \omega))^{d_i} (1 - p_i(x, \omega))^{1-d_i} \right]$$

and can proceed in a similar way as Step 1 for the Simple Game. Overidentifying restrictions are used to improve estimation accuracy.

Step 2 identification is similar to that of the Simple Game. Denote  $l_x \equiv |\mathcal{X}|$  and  $\mathcal{X} \equiv \{x^1, \dots, x^{l_x}\}$ . We can obtain the following system for player 1 via stacking composite latent variables on each  $x$  for  $x \in \mathcal{X}$ :

$$\begin{aligned} G(\pi) &= [\bar{\pi}_1^\top(x^1), \dots, \bar{\pi}_1^\top(x^{l_x})]^\top - [\Gamma_1^\top(x^1), \dots, \Gamma_1^\top(x^{l_x})]^\top \pi, \quad \text{where} \\ \bar{\pi}_1(x) &\equiv [\bar{\pi}_1(1, x, \omega(1, x)), \dots, \bar{\pi}_1(1, x, \omega(|\Omega_x|, x))]^\top \quad \text{and} \\ \Gamma_1(x) &\text{ is } \left[ \begin{bmatrix} x & p(x, \omega(1, x)) \end{bmatrix}^\top, \dots, \begin{bmatrix} x & p(x, \omega(|\Omega_x|, x)) \end{bmatrix}^\top \right]^\top \quad \text{in Game 3 and} \\ &\left[ \begin{bmatrix} x & (1+x^2)(2p(x, \omega(1, x)) - 1) \end{bmatrix}^\top, \dots, \begin{bmatrix} x & (1+x^2)(2p(x, \omega(|\Omega_x|, x)) - 1) \end{bmatrix}^\top \right]^\top \\ &\quad \text{in Game 4.} \end{aligned}$$

The dimensions for  $\bar{\pi}$  and  $\Gamma$  are  $(2(l_x - 1) + 3) \times 1$  and  $(2(l_x - 1) + 3) \times 2$  when only observed state 8 has multiple equilibria. The dimensions for  $\bar{\pi}$  and  $\Gamma$  are  $(2(l_x - 2) + 6) \times 1$  and  $(2(l_x - 2) + 6) \times 2$  when both observed state 8 and observed state 16 have multiple equilibria.

In the simulations,  $l_x = 18$ . The number of unknowns in the system is strictly less than the number of correct moments. The parameter values used in the simulation satisfy Assumption 5.3 for Step 2 identification. Given some selected value of the composite latent variable for  $x^1$ , we could try to match its underlying latent state  $k$  across all common observed states with the parameter spaces of the true selection vectors specified as follows:

Design 1: 3 mixing components on the 8th observed state:

$$\mathcal{C}^1 = \left\{ \begin{array}{l} [c_1, \dots, c_{l_x}]^\top : c_1 \in \{[1, 0], [1, 1]\} \text{ and } c_t \in \{[1, 0], [0, 1], [1, 1]\} \text{ for } t \neq 8 \text{ and} \\ c_8 \in \{[1, 0, 0], [0, 1, 0], [0, 0, 1], [0, 1, 1], [1, 0, 1], [1, 1, 0], [1, 1, 1]\} \end{array} \right\},$$

$$\mathcal{C}^2 = \left\{ \begin{array}{l} [c_1, \dots, c_{l_x}]^\top : c_1 \in \{[0, 1], [1, 1]\} \text{ and } c_t \in \{[1, 0], [0, 1], [1, 1]\} \text{ for } t \neq 8 \text{ and} \\ c_8 \in \{[1, 0, 0], [0, 1, 0], [0, 0, 1], [0, 1, 1], [1, 0, 1], [1, 1, 0], [1, 1, 1]\} \end{array} \right\}.$$

Design 2: 3 mixing components on both the 8th and the 16th observed state:

$$\mathcal{C}^1 = \left\{ \begin{array}{l} [c_1, \dots, c_{l_x}]^\top : c_1 \in \{[1, 0], [1, 1]\} \text{ and } c_t \in \{[1, 0], [0, 1], [1, 1]\} \text{ for } t \notin \{8, 16\} \text{ and} \\ c_t \in \{[1, 0, 0], [0, 1, 0], [0, 0, 1], [0, 1, 1], [1, 0, 1], [1, 1, 0], [1, 1, 1]\} \text{ for } t \in \{8, 16\} \end{array} \right\},$$

$$\mathcal{C}^2 = \left\{ \begin{array}{l} [c_1, \dots, c_{l_x}]^\top : c_1 \in \{[0, 1], [1, 1]\} \text{ and } c_t \in \{[1, 0], [0, 1], [1, 1]\} \text{ for } t \notin \{8, 16\} \text{ and} \\ c_t \in \{[1, 0, 0], [0, 1, 0], [0, 0, 1], [0, 1, 1], [1, 0, 1], [1, 1, 0], [1, 1, 1]\} \text{ for } t \in \{8, 16\} \end{array} \right\}.$$

Given a parameter space of the true selection vector with the first selected underlying latent state being  $k$ , the unique solution to the system  $G_{c_0}(\pi) = \mathbf{0}$  gives us  $(\theta_k, \delta_k)^\top$ .

## D.2 Parameter values in the simulation

For Table I and Table II in Section 6 of the main paper, the parameter values in the payoff functions and the values for the observed state variables are set according to Design 1 of Game 1 below. For Table III, the parameter values in the payoff functions and the values for the observed state variables are set according to Designs 1–5 for both games below. Note that for all designs, the parameter values in the payoff functions stay the same for both games while the support of the observed state  $\mathbf{z}$  changes.

*Game 1* For Design 1,  $\mathcal{X}_1 = \{0.1, 0.8\}$ ,  $\mathcal{X}_2 = \{0.1, 0.8, 1.5\}$ , and  $\mathcal{X}_3 = \{0.1, 0.8, 1.5\}$ . For Design 2,  $\mathcal{X}_1 = \{0.1, 0.8, 1.5\}$ ,  $\mathcal{X}_2 = \{0.1, 0.8, 1.5\}$ , and  $\mathcal{X}_3 = \{0.1, 0.8, 1.5\}$ . For Design 3,  $\mathcal{X}_1 = \{0.1, 0.8, 1.3, 1.5\}$ ,  $\mathcal{X}_2 = \{0.1, 0.8, 1.3, 1.5\}$ , and  $\mathcal{X}_3 = \{0.1, 0.8, 1.3, 1.5\}$ . For Design 4,  $\mathcal{X}_1 = \{0.1, 0.8, 1.3, 1.5\}$ ,  $\mathcal{X}_2 = \{0.1, 0.8, 1.1, 1.3, 1.5\}$ , and  $\mathcal{X}_3 = \{0.1, 0.8, 1.1, 1.3, 1.5\}$ . And for Design 5,  $\mathcal{X}_1 = \{0.1, 0.7, 0.8, 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 1.5\}$ ,  $\mathcal{X}_2 = \{0.1, 0.7, 0.8, 1.1, 1.3, 1.5\}$ , and  $\mathcal{X}_3 = \{0.1, 0.7, 0.8, 1.1, 1.3, 1.5\}$ . The parameter values in the payoff functions are set according to Table D.1 below and are the same across Design 1–Design 5.

*Game 2* For Design 1,  $\mathcal{X} = \{0.4, 0.7, 0.8\}$ ,  $\mathcal{X}_1 = \{0.5, 1.2\}$ ,  $\mathcal{X}_2 = \{0.5, 1.2\}$ , and  $\mathcal{X}_3 = \{0.5, 1.2\}$ . For Design 2,  $\mathcal{X} = \{0.4, 0.7, 0.8\}$ ,  $\mathcal{X}_1 = \{0.5, 0.9, 1.2\}$ ,  $\mathcal{X}_2 = \{0.5, 1.2\}$ , and  $\mathcal{X}_3 = \{0.5, 1.2\}$ . For Design 3,  $\mathcal{X} = \{0.4, 0.7, 0.8\}$ ,  $\mathcal{X}_1 = \{0.5, 0.9, 1.2\}$ ,  $\mathcal{X}_2 = \{0.5, 0.9, 1.2\}$ , and  $\mathcal{X}_3 = \{0.5, 1.2\}$ . For Design 4,  $\mathcal{X} = \{0.4, 0.7, 0.8\}$ ,  $\mathcal{X}_1 = \{0.5, 0.9, 1.2\}$ ,  $\mathcal{X}_2 = \{0.5, 0.9, 1.2\}$ ,

TABLE D.1. Parameter values in Game 1.

$\delta_{1A}$	$\delta_{1B}$	$\delta_{2A}$	$\delta_{2B}$	$\delta_{3A}$	$\delta_{3B}$	$\theta_{1A}$	$\theta_{1B}$	$\theta_{2A}$	$\theta_{2B}$	$\theta_{3A}$	$\theta_{3B}$
-0.01	-5	-0.02	-5.5	-0.02	-5.5	2.2	0.4	2.5	0.4	2.5	0.4

TABLE D.2. Parameter values in Game 2.

$\delta_{1A}$	$\delta_{1B}$	$\delta_{2A}$	$\delta_{2B}$	$\delta_{3A}$	$\delta_{3B}$	$\beta_{1A}$	$\beta_{1B}$	$\beta_{2A}$	$\beta_{2B}$	$\beta_{3A}$	$\beta_{3B}$
-0.1	-2	-0.2	-1.9	-0.3	-1.8	3	0.1	2.6	0.2	2.7	0.1

and  $\mathcal{Z}_3 = \{0.5, 0.9, 1.2\}$ . And for Design 5,  $\mathcal{X} = \{0.4, 0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9\}$ ,  $\mathcal{Z}_1 = \{0.5, 0.9, 1.2\}$ ,  $\mathcal{Z}_2 = \{0.5, 0.9, 1.2\}$ , and  $\mathcal{Z}_3 = \{0.5, 0.9, 1.2\}$ . The parameter values in the payoff functions are set according to Table D.2 below and are the same across Design 1–Design 5.

For Table VI, the parameter values in the payoff functions and the values for the observed state variable are set according to Design 1–2 for Game 3 and Game 4 below.

*Game 3* For Design 1,  $x \in \mathcal{X} = \{-1.6, -1.5, -1.4, -1.3, -1.2, -0.8, -0.55, -0.45, -0.35, -0.3, -0.25, -0.2, -0.15, -0.1, -0.05, 0.05, 0.1, 0.15\}$ , there are multiple equilibria on latent state  $A$  for  $x = -1.5$  (in the simulation this is designated as the 8th observed state). For Design 2,  $x \in \mathcal{X} = \{-1.6, -1.5, -1.4, -1.3, -1.2, -0.8, -0.55, -0.45, -0.35, -0.3, -0.25, -0.2, -0.15, -0.1, -0.05, 0.05, 0.1, 0.15\}$  there are multiple equilibria on latent state  $A$  for  $x = -1.5$  and  $x = -1.4$  (in the simulation these are designated as the 8th and 16th observed states, respectively);  $\theta_B = 0.1$ ,  $\delta_B = -0.2$ ,  $\theta_A = 1.1$ ,  $\delta_A = 3.2$  for both designs.

*Game 4* For Design 1,  $x \in \mathcal{X} = \{-1.25, -1.2, -1.15, -1.1, -1.05, -1, -0.95, -0.9, -0.8, -0.75, -0.7, -0.65, -0.6, -0.5, 0.4, 0.45, 0.55, 0.85\}$ , there are multiple equilibria on latent state  $A$  for  $x = 0.85$  (in the simulation this is designated as the 8th observed state). For Design 2,  $x \in \mathcal{X} = \{-1.2, -1.15, -1.1, -1.05, -1, -0.95, -0.9, -0.8, -0.75, -0.7, -0.65, -0.6, -0.5, 0.4, 0.45, 0.5, 0.55, 0.85\}$ , there are multiple equilibria on latent state  $A$  for  $x = 0.85$  and  $x = 0.5$  (in the simulation these are designated as the 8th and 16th observed states, respectively);  $\theta_B = 2.4$ ,  $\delta_B = -0.6$ ,  $\theta_A = 2$ ,  $\delta_A = 4$  for both designs.

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