Social decision mechanisms that admit dominant strategies and result in Pareto optima are characterized by the class of mechanisms proposed by Groves. The concept of decision mechanisms is generalized and the characterization is shown to extend to these cases.
MLA
Laffont, Jean-Jacques, and Jerry Green. “Characterization of Satisfactory Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences for Public Goods.” Econometrica, vol. 45, .no 2, Econometric Society, 1977, pp. 427-438, https://www.jstor.org/stable/1911219
Chicago
Laffont, Jean-Jacques, and Jerry Green. “Characterization of Satisfactory Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences for Public Goods.” Econometrica, 45, .no 2, (Econometric Society: 1977), 427-438. https://www.jstor.org/stable/1911219
APA
Laffont, J.-J., & Green, J. (1977). Characterization of Satisfactory Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences for Public Goods. Econometrica, 45(2), 427-438. https://www.jstor.org/stable/1911219
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