Econometrica

Journal Of The Econometric Society

An International Society for the Advancement of Economic
Theory in its Relation to Statistics and Mathematics

Edited by: Guido W. Imbens • Print ISSN: 0012-9682 • Online ISSN: 1468-0262

Home> Publications> Econometrica>Incentive Efficiency of Double Auctions

Econometrica: Sep, 1985, Volume 53, Issue 5

Incentive Efficiency of Double Auctions

https://www.jstor.org/stable/1911013
p. 1101-1116

Robert Wilson

For a specified class of economic environments, a double auction in which numerous buyers and sellers submit sealed bids and offers is incentive efficient, in the sense that there is no other trading rule that is sure to be preferred by each agent, whatever his preferences.

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The Executive Committee of the Econometric Society has approved an increase in the submission fees for papers in Econometrica.  Starting January 1, 2025, the fee for new submissions to Econometrica will be US$125 for regular members and US$50 for student members.
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