This paper examines of general, finite state stochastic games. Our main result is that the number of such equilibria is finite for a set of stochastic game payoffs with full Lebesgue measure. We further discuss extensions to lower dimensional stochastic games like the alternating move game.
MLA
Haller, Hans, and Roger Lagunoff. “Genericity and Markovian Behavior in Stochastic Games.” Econometrica, vol. 68, .no 5, Econometric Society, 2000, pp. 1231-1248, https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0262.00156
Chicago
Haller, Hans, and Roger Lagunoff. “Genericity and Markovian Behavior in Stochastic Games.” Econometrica, 68, .no 5, (Econometric Society: 2000), 1231-1248. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0262.00156
APA
Haller, H., & Lagunoff, R. (2000). Genericity and Markovian Behavior in Stochastic Games. Econometrica, 68(5), 1231-1248. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0262.00156
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