In a differential information economy with quasi–linear utilities, monetary transfers facilitate the fulfillment of incentive compatibility constraints: the associated ex ante core is generically nonempty. However, we exhibit a well–behaved exchange economy in which this core is empty, even if goods are allocated through random mechanisms.
MLA
Forges, Françoise, et al. “The Ex Ante Incentive Compatible Core in the Absence of Wealth Effects.” Econometrica, vol. 70, .no 5, Econometric Society, 2002, pp. 1865-1892, https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0262.00356
Chicago
Forges, Françoise, Jean–François Mertens, and Rajiv Vohra. “The Ex Ante Incentive Compatible Core in the Absence of Wealth Effects.” Econometrica, 70, .no 5, (Econometric Society: 2002), 1865-1892. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0262.00356
APA
Forges, F., Mertens, J., & Vohra, R. (2002). The Ex Ante Incentive Compatible Core in the Absence of Wealth Effects. Econometrica, 70(5), 1865-1892. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0262.00356
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