Econometrica: Nov, 2006, Volume 74, Issue 6

Reciprocal Upper Semicontinuity and Better Reply Secure Games: A Comment

https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0262.2006.00724.x
p. 1715-1721

Adib Bagh, Alejandro Jofre

A convex, compact, and possibly discontinuous better reply secure game has a Nash equilibrium. We introduce a very weak notion of continuity that can be used to establish that a game is better reply secure and we show that this notion of continuity is satisfied by a large class of games.

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