A convex, compact, and possibly discontinuous better reply secure game has a Nash equilibrium. We introduce a very weak notion of continuity that can be used to establish that a game is better reply secure and we show that this notion of continuity is satisfied by a large class of games.
MLA
Bagh, Adib, and Alejandro Jofre. “Reciprocal Upper Semicontinuity and Better Reply Secure Games: A Comment.” Econometrica, vol. 74, .no 6, Econometric Society, 2006, pp. 1715-1721, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0262.2006.00724.x
Chicago
Bagh, Adib, and Alejandro Jofre. “Reciprocal Upper Semicontinuity and Better Reply Secure Games: A Comment.” Econometrica, 74, .no 6, (Econometric Society: 2006), 1715-1721. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0262.2006.00724.x
APA
Bagh, A., & Jofre, A. (2006). Reciprocal Upper Semicontinuity and Better Reply Secure Games: A Comment. Econometrica, 74(6), 1715-1721. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0262.2006.00724.x
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