Econometrica: Sep, 2011, Volume 79, Issue 5

Simple Bounds on the Value of a Reputation

https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA9385
p. 1627-1641

Olivier Gossner

We introduce entropy techniques to study the classical reputation model in which a long‐run player faces a series of short‐run players. The long‐run player's actions are possibly imperfectly observed. We derive explicit lower and upper bounds on the equilibrium payoffs to the long‐run player.

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