Econometrica

Journal Of The Econometric Society

An International Society for the Advancement of Economic
Theory in its Relation to Statistics and Mathematics

Edited by: Guido W. Imbens • Print ISSN: 0012-9682 • Online ISSN: 1468-0262

Home> Publications> Econometrica>Impatience versus Incentives

Econometrica: Jul, 2015, Volume 83, Issue 4

Impatience versus Incentives

https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA11473
p. 1601-1617

M. M. Opp and J. Y. Zhu

This paper studies the dynamics of long‐term contracts in repeated principal–agent relationships with an impatient agent. Despite the absence of exogenous uncertainty, Pareto‐optimal dynamic contracts generically oscillate between favoring the principal and favoring the agent.

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December 4, 2024

Update on 2025 Submission and Publication Page Fees at Econometric Society Journals

The Executive Committee of the Econometric Society has approved an increase in the submission fees for papers in Econometrica.  Starting January 1, 2025, the fee for new submissions to Econometrica will be US$125 for regular members and US$50 for student members.
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