We revisit the Nash bargaining model and axiomatize a procedural solution that maximizes the probability of successful bargaining. Our characterization spans several known solution concepts, including the special cases of the Nash, egalitarian, and utilitarian solutions. Using a probability‐based language, we offer a natural interpretation for the product operator underlying the Nash solution: when the bargainers' individual acceptance probabilities are independent, their product recovers the joint acceptance probability.
MLA
Bastianello, Lorenzo, and Marco LiCalzi. “The Probability to Reach an Agreement as a Foundation for Axiomatic Bargaining.” Econometrica, vol. 87, .no 3, Econometric Society, 2019, pp. 837-865, https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA13673
Chicago
Bastianello, Lorenzo, and Marco LiCalzi. “The Probability to Reach an Agreement as a Foundation for Axiomatic Bargaining.” Econometrica, 87, .no 3, (Econometric Society: 2019), 837-865. https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA13673
APA
Bastianello, L., & LiCalzi, M. (2019). The Probability to Reach an Agreement as a Foundation for Axiomatic Bargaining. Econometrica, 87(3), 837-865. https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA13673
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