A theory of dynamic optimal resource allocation to R and D in an n-firm industry is developed using differential games. This technique represents a synthesis of the analytic methods previously applied to the problem: static game theory and optimal control. The use of particular functional forms allows the computation and detailed discussion of the Nash equilibrium in investment rules.
MLA
Reinganum, Jennifer F.. “A Dynamic Game of R and D: Patent Protection and Competitive Behavior.” Econometrica, vol. 50, .no 3, Econometric Society, 1982, pp. 671-688, https://www.jstor.org/stable/1912607
Chicago
Reinganum, Jennifer F.. “A Dynamic Game of R and D: Patent Protection and Competitive Behavior.” Econometrica, 50, .no 3, (Econometric Society: 1982), 671-688. https://www.jstor.org/stable/1912607
APA
Reinganum, J. F. (1982). A Dynamic Game of R and D: Patent Protection and Competitive Behavior. Econometrica, 50(3), 671-688. https://www.jstor.org/stable/1912607
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