This paper presents an analysis of a 2-person noncooperative bargaining game in which one party is free, subject to certain frictions, to switch between rival partners. This permits us to capture the notion of an asymmetry between "insiders" and "outsiders" in the context of a firm bargaining with its workers, in the presence of unemployment.
MLA
Shaked, Avner, and John Sutton. “Involuntary Unemployment as a Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model.” Econometrica, vol. 52, .no 6, Econometric Society, 1984, pp. 1351-1364, https://www.jstor.org/stable/1913509
Chicago
Shaked, Avner, and John Sutton. “Involuntary Unemployment as a Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model.” Econometrica, 52, .no 6, (Econometric Society: 1984), 1351-1364. https://www.jstor.org/stable/1913509
APA
Shaked, A., & Sutton, J. (1984). Involuntary Unemployment as a Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model. Econometrica, 52(6), 1351-1364. https://www.jstor.org/stable/1913509
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