The Econometric SocietyEdited by: Guido W. Imbens • Print ISSN: 0012-9682 • Online ISSN: 1468-0262
Lemma 1 of Ray and Vohra (2019) is false as stated, but holds under alternative conditions which are consistent with the ideas of coalitional sovereignty that motivate the cited paper.
THIS DOCUMENT CORRECTS AN ERROR in Eeckhout and Kircher (2018) in the sign of an underived condition for positive assortative matching (PAM thereafter) within those extensions that allows for generic capital investment: It occurs in the applications of the main theory to The skill premium with generic capital investment and The misallocation debate; see page 104. This note provides the correct condition, proves it, and adjusts the accompanying example.
This paper corrects a minor error found in the original article.
This paper corrects a minor error found in Appendix D.
This paper corrects a minor error found in the original article.
Jaap H. Abbring and Gerard J. van den Berg
This note identifies and corrects a mistake in (the proofs of) Propositions 4 and 5.
This note points out that the proof of Theorem 1, the main theorem, in Ergin (2002) needs two corrections. We provide two counterexamples to Ergin’s (2002) proof and show that the theorem holds as it is by providing an alternative proof.
There is a mistake in the discussion in Hu, L. (2002) discussed in this corrigendum.
Xiaofang Dong and Stephen L. Ross
This paper corrects a minor error found in the original article.
Smith (1995) proved a perfect folk theorem for finitely-repeated stage games with recursively distinct Nash payoffs, without assuming a non-equivalent utilities (NEU) condition. While his theorem is correct, the constructive proof contained a small gap, using strategies only guaranteed to form a SPNE under NEU. Here, we illustrate the gap with a counterexample, and resolve it with a small adjustment to his strategies.
Hey, J. D. and Orme, C. (1994) proposed a new utility functional for Gul, F. (1991) disappointment aversion theory. Hey, J. D. and Orme, C. (1994) proved that this utility functional is identical to that in Gul, F. (1991) for the case when lotteries have at most three outcomes. We show that there is an algebraic mistake in this proof and the utility functional proposed in Hey, J. D. and Orme, C. (1994) is not the same as in Gul, F. (1991) disappointment aversion theory.
In their analysis of strategic information transmission, Vincent Crawford and Joel
Sobel (1982) showed the existence of partition equilibria (Theorem 1). Although the
theorem itself is correct, the proof contains some incorrect statements. We present a
counter-example and provide a correct version of the proof.
Aumann, R.J.
This corrigendum corrects a minor error found in the original article.
In this note, we reconsider Arrow–Enthoven’s (1961) Sufficiency Theorem 1 on quasi-concave programming [Econometrica, 29(4), p. 783]. One example illustrates the fact that condition (c) of their Theorem 1 should include the twice continuous differentiability of the quasi-concave objective function so that the conditions of the theorem are sufficient to identify global optima.
This note provides supplementary arguments for Billot, Gilboa, Samet, and Schmeidler (2005, hereafter BGSS). The result there is strengthened so that it also holds in situations where multiple cases are mapped to the same probability assessment, a possibility allowed but unaddressed by the original paper.
Jaap H. Abbring and Jeffrey R. Campbell
This paper corrects a minor error found in the original article.
