We consider a general mechanism design setting where each agent can acquire (covert) information before participating in the mechanism. The central question is whether a mechanism exists that provides the efficient incentives for information acquisition ex‐ante and implements the efficient allocation conditional on the private information ex‐post.
MLA
Bergemann, Dirk, and Juuso Välimäki. “Information Acquisition and Efficient Mechanism Design.” Econometrica, vol. 70, .no 3, Econometric Society, 2002, pp. 1007-1033, https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0262.00317
Chicago
Bergemann, Dirk, and Juuso Välimäki. “Information Acquisition and Efficient Mechanism Design.” Econometrica, 70, .no 3, (Econometric Society: 2002), 1007-1033. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0262.00317
APA
Bergemann, D., & Välimäki, J. (2002). Information Acquisition and Efficient Mechanism Design. Econometrica, 70(3), 1007-1033. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0262.00317
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