An asymmetric information model of a finite horizon “th order” rational asset price bubble is presented, where (all agents know that) the asset is worthless. Also, the model has only two agents, so the first order version of the bubble is simpler than other first order bubbles in the literature.
MLA
Conlon, John R.. “Simple Finite Horizon Bubbles Robust to Higher Order Knowledge.” Econometrica, vol. 72, .no 3, Econometric Society, 2004, pp. 927-936, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0262.2004.00516.x
Chicago
Conlon, John R.. “Simple Finite Horizon Bubbles Robust to Higher Order Knowledge.” Econometrica, 72, .no 3, (Econometric Society: 2004), 927-936. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0262.2004.00516.x
APA
Conlon, J. R. (2004). Simple Finite Horizon Bubbles Robust to Higher Order Knowledge. Econometrica, 72(3), 927-936. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0262.2004.00516.x
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