Each agent in a finite set requests an integer quantity of an idiosyncratic good; the resulting total cost must be shared among the participating agents. The Aumann–Shapley prices are given by the Shapley value of the game where each unit of each good is regarded as a distinct player. The Aumann–Shapley charges to an agent the sum of the prices attached to the units she consumes.
MLA
Sprumont, Yves. “On the Discrete Version of the Aumann–Shapley Cost‐Sharing Method.” Econometrica, vol. 73, .no 5, Econometric Society, 2005, pp. 1693-1712, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0262.2005.00633.x
Chicago
Sprumont, Yves. “On the Discrete Version of the Aumann–Shapley Cost‐Sharing Method.” Econometrica, 73, .no 5, (Econometric Society: 2005), 1693-1712. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0262.2005.00633.x
APA
Sprumont, Y. (2005). On the Discrete Version of the Aumann–Shapley Cost‐Sharing Method. Econometrica, 73(5), 1693-1712. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0262.2005.00633.x
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