The Econometric SocietyEdited by: Guido W. Imbens • Print ISSN: 0012-9682 • Online ISSN: 1468-0262
Econometrica: Jul, 2006, Volume 74, Issue 4
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0262.2006.00695.x
p. 1109-1132
Sushil Bikhchandani, Shurojit Chatterji, Ron Lavi, Ahuva Mu'alem, Noam Nisan, Arunava Sen
We characterize dominant‐strategy incentive compatibility with multidimensional types. A deterministic social choice function is dominant‐strategy incentive compatible if and only if it is weakly monotone (W‐Mon). The W‐Mon requirement is the following: If changing one agent's type (while keeping the types of other agents fixed) changes the outcome under the social choice function, then the resulting difference in utilities of the new and original outcomes evaluated at the new type of this agent must be no less than this difference in utilities evaluated at the original type of this agent.
In our main paper, we define a weak-monotonicity (W-Mon) condition that is necessary and sufficient for dominant-strategy implementation in a variety of domains. This supplementary material complements the discussion there by providing additional examples and proofs. The notation used here is defined in the paper.
In our main paper, we define a weak-monotonicity (W-Mon) condition that is necessary and sufficient for dominant-strategy implementation in a variety of domains. This supplementary material complements the discussion there by providing additional examples and proofs. The notation used here is defined in the paper.
