We report an experiment on effects of varying institutional format and dynamic structure of centipede games and Dutch auctions. Centipede games with a clock format unravel, as predicted by theory but not reported in previous literature on two‐player tree‐format centipede games. Dutch auctions with a tree format produce bids close to risk neutral Nash equilibrium bids, unlike previous literature on clock‐format Dutch auctions. Our data provide a new, expanded set of stylized facts which may provide a foundation for unified modeling of play in a class of games that includes centipede games and Dutch auctions.
MLA
Cox, James C., and Duncan James. “Clocks and Trees: Isomorphic Dutch Auctions and Centipede Games.” Econometrica, vol. 80, .no 2, Econometric Society, 2012, pp. 883-903, https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA9589
Chicago
Cox, James C., and Duncan James. “Clocks and Trees: Isomorphic Dutch Auctions and Centipede Games.” Econometrica, 80, .no 2, (Econometric Society: 2012), 883-903. https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA9589
APA
Cox, J. C., & James, D. (2012). Clocks and Trees: Isomorphic Dutch Auctions and Centipede Games. Econometrica, 80(2), 883-903. https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA9589
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