The Econometric SocietyEdited by: Guido W. Imbens • Print ISSN: 0012-9682 • Online ISSN: 1468-0262
Econometrica: Sep, 2015, Volume 83, Issue 5
https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA12058
p. 1755-1794
Elchanan Mossel, Allan Sly, Omer Tamuz
We consider a group of strategic agents who must each repeatedly take one of two possible actions. They learn which of the two actions is preferable from initial private signals and by observing the actions of their neighbors in a social network.
This appendix gives two examples showing that the assumptions of bounded out-degree and L-connectedness are crucial. Our approach in constructing equilibria will be to prescribe the initial moves of the agents and then extend this to an equilibrium strategy profile.
