Quantitative Economics
Journal Of The Econometric Society
Edited by: Stéphane Bonhomme • Print ISSN: 1759-7323 • Online ISSN: 1759-7331
Edited by: Stéphane Bonhomme • Print ISSN: 1759-7323 • Online ISSN: 1759-7331
Quantitative Economics: Jul, 2023, Volume 14, Issue 3
https://doi.org/10.3982/QE1563
p. 981-1020
Romain Gauriot, Lionel Page, John Wooders
Mixed‐strategy Nash equilibrium is the cornerstone of our understanding of strategic situations that require decision makers to be unpredictable. Using data from nearly half a million serves over 3000 tennis matches, and data on player rankings from the ATP and WTA, we examine whether the behavior of professional tennis players is consistent with equilibrium. We find that win rates conform remarkably closely to the theory for men, but conform somewhat less neatly for women. We show that the behavior in the field of more highly ranked (i.e., better) players conforms more closely to theory. We show that the statistical tests used in the prior related literature are not valid for large samples like ours; we develop a novel statistical test that is valid and show, via Monte Carlo simulations, that it is more powerful against the alternative that receivers follows a nonequilibrium mixture.
Romain Gauriot, Lionel Page, and John Wooders
This online appendix contains material not found within the manuscript.
Romain Gauriot, Lionel Page, and John Wooders
This zip file contains the replication files for the manuscript.
December 4, 2024