The Econometric SocietyEdited by: Guido W. Imbens • Print ISSN: 0012-9682 • Online ISSN: 1468-0262
This appendix contains material not found in the manuscript.
This appendix gives two examples showing that the assumptions of bounded out-degree and L-connectedness are crucial. Our approach in constructing equilibria will be to prescribe the initial moves of the agents and then extend this to an equilibrium strategy profile.
This supplement contains additional material on Markov Decision Problems and details on the proof of Theorem 5.
Appendix A provides a formal analysis of the finite market model introduced in Section 4. Appendix B considers a finite competing (procurement) auctions model with reserve price posting and show that the market outcome is not constrained efficient whenever there are at least three procurers and at least two of them are heterogeneous. Appendix C constructs the set of all interval partitional equilibria, which includes the fully revealing equilibrium as a special case. Then it shows that the fully revealing equilibrium uniquely satisfies neologism proofness by Farrell (1993). Appendix D shows that the fully revealing equilibrium exists even if agents are risk averse. Appendix E demonstrates that our main result continues to hold even when contractors are heterogeneous.
This appendix provides supplementary material to accompany the main text. Section A discusses the psychological foundations for our approach. Section B provides full arguments for all the results in the main text concerning history-dependent equilibria; essentially, up to and including Proposition 4. Section C proves our assertions for the simplified model of Section 5.4 in the paper, and provides associated computational results. Section D provides detailed arguments for results involving Markov perfect equilibria. Section E describes the algorithm for computing subgame-perfect equilibrium values, and the parameter choices for the examples in the main text. Section F provides computed examples with and without poverty traps. Section G shows that a poverty trap is present even when MPE is used as punishment. Finally, Section H presents the details of the model with taste shocks and lockbox saving regimes. Referenced equations that appear in this Appendix are labeled as (a.1), (a.2), etc. Other equation references are to equations in the main text.
This appendix contains further details on the data and analysis presented in the paper.
This zip file contains the replication files for the manuscript.
This zip file contains the replication files for the manuscript.
This appendix provides information on the estimation of the QUAIDS demand systems used in the manuscript.
This appendix contains additional proofs for the manuscript.
This appendix details the experimental protocols used in running the experiment. This includes the instructions, the quiz, and a screenshot of an example game. This file also contains the experimental data which includes the actions played by each subject in the 8 games, the treatment, and their classified order of rationality.
